[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20181102182908.295458953@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 19:35:16 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>,
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 131/143] ethtool: fix a privilege escalation bug
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
[ Upstream commit 58f5bbe331c566f49c9559568f982202a278aa78 ]
In dev_ethtool(), the eth command 'ethcmd' is firstly copied from the
use-space buffer 'useraddr' and checked to see whether it is
ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE. If yes, the sub-command 'sub_cmd' is further copied from
the user space. Otherwise, 'sub_cmd' is the same as 'ethcmd'. Next,
according to 'sub_cmd', a permission check is enforced through the function
ns_capable(). For example, the permission check is required if 'sub_cmd' is
ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE, but it is not necessary if 'sub_cmd' is
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE, as suggested in the comment "Allow some commands to be
done by anyone". The following execution invokes different handlers
according to 'ethcmd'. Specifically, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE,
ethtool_set_per_queue() is called. In ethtool_set_per_queue(), the kernel
object 'per_queue_opt' is copied again from the user-space buffer
'useraddr' and 'per_queue_opt.sub_command' is used to determine which
operation should be performed. Given that the buffer 'useraddr' is in the
user space, a malicious user can race to change the sub-command between the
two copies. In particular, the attacker can supply ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE and
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to bypass the permission check in dev_ethtool(). Then
before ethtool_set_per_queue() is called, the attacker changes
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE. In this way, the attacker can
bypass the permission check and execute ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE.
This patch enforces a check in ethtool_set_per_queue() after the second
copy from 'useraddr'. If the sub-command is different from the one obtained
in the first copy in dev_ethtool(), an error code EINVAL will be returned.
Fixes: f38d138a7da6 ("net/ethtool: support set coalesce per queue")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/ethtool.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -2410,13 +2410,17 @@ roll_back:
return ret;
}
-static int ethtool_set_per_queue(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
+static int ethtool_set_per_queue(struct net_device *dev,
+ void __user *useraddr, u32 sub_cmd)
{
struct ethtool_per_queue_op per_queue_opt;
if (copy_from_user(&per_queue_opt, useraddr, sizeof(per_queue_opt)))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (per_queue_opt.sub_command != sub_cmd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
switch (per_queue_opt.sub_command) {
case ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE:
return ethtool_get_per_queue_coalesce(dev, useraddr, &per_queue_opt);
@@ -2787,7 +2791,7 @@ int dev_ethtool(struct net *net, struct
rc = ethtool_get_phy_stats(dev, useraddr);
break;
case ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE:
- rc = ethtool_set_per_queue(dev, useraddr);
+ rc = ethtool_set_per_queue(dev, useraddr, sub_cmd);
break;
case ETHTOOL_GLINKSETTINGS:
rc = ethtool_get_link_ksettings(dev, useraddr);
Powered by blists - more mailing lists