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Message-ID: <CAHp75VctUJRTecG4rVHXm0uO18ZndMgqJgtNyG25HtSzJF5uzg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2018 15:15:15 +0200
From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@...il.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: "maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>,
Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
sean.j.christopherson@...el.com, nhorman@...hat.com,
npmccallum@...hat.com, serge.ayoun@...el.com,
shay.katz-zamir@...el.com, haitao.huang@...el.com,
mark.shanahan@...el.com,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
davidwang@...oxin.com,
"Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)" <alexander.levin@...izon.com>,
qianyue.zj@...baba-inc.com,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 14/23] x86/cpu/intel: Clear SGX_LC capability if not
enabled in FEATURE_CONTROL
On Sat, Nov 3, 2018 at 1:17 AM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
>
> Like SGX itself, SGX Launch Control must be explicitly enabled via a
> flag in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL. Clear the SGX_LC capability if Launch
> Control is not fully enabled (or obviously if SGX itself is disabled).
>
> Note that clearing X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC creates a bit of a conundrum
> regarding the SGXLEPUBKEYHASH MSRs, as it may be desirable to read the
> MSRs even if they are not writable, e.g. to query the configured key,
> but clearing the capability leaves no breadcrum for discerning whether
> or not the MSRs exist. But, such usage will be rare (KVM is the only
> known case at this time) and not performance critical, so it's not
> unreasonable to require the use of rdmsr_safe(). Clearing the cap bit
> eliminates the need for an additional flag to track whether or not
> Launch Control is truly enabled, which is what we care about the vast
> majority of the time.
> @@ -618,6 +618,8 @@ static void detect_sgx(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
> setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
> }
> + if (unsupported || !(fc & FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR))
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
> }
A-ha, I see how you use this variable here (though it's still possible
to get rid of it, choose what is better for readability /
maintenance).
--
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko
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