linux-kernel - Re: [git pull] mount API series

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Message-ID: <84b73e19-0a85-2408-7974-79300820270d@huawei.com>
Date:   Sat, 3 Nov 2018 14:14:11 +0800
From:   Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25@...wei.com>
To:     Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
CC:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        <swhiteho@...hat.com>, <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        <alan.christopher.jenkins@...il.com>, <ebiederm@...hat.com>,
        <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [git pull] mount API series

Hi Al,

On 2018/11/3 3:42, Al Viro wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 02, 2018 at 04:07:01AM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
>> On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 11:59:23PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
>>
>>>  (*) mount-api-core.  These are the internal-only patches that add the
>>>      fs_context, the legacy wrapper and the security hooks and make certain
>>>      filesystems make use of it.
>>
>> FWIW, while rereading that series I'd spotted something very odd in erofs.
>> It's orthogonal to everything else, but just to make sure it doesn't get
>> lost:
>> 	* sbi->dev_name thing in erofs is used only for debugging printks,
>> basically.  Just use sb->s_id[] and be done with that.
>> 	* dump struct erofs_mount_private - you don't need dev_name in
>> your erofs_fill_super().  Just use mount_bdev() in usual fashion.
>> 	* what the hell are you doing with ->s_root???  Why would you
>> possibly want it hashed and what kind of dcache lookup could find it?
>> That d_rehash() looks deeply confused; what are you trying to do there?
> 
> ... and while we are at it, what happens to
>                 unsigned int nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de[mid].nameoff);
>                 unsigned int matched = min(startprfx, endprfx);
> 
>                 struct qstr dname = QSTR_INIT(data + nameoff,
>                         unlikely(mid >= ndirents - 1) ?
>                                 maxsize - nameoff :
>                                 le16_to_cpu(de[mid + 1].nameoff) - nameoff);
> 
>                 /* string comparison without already matched prefix */
>                 int ret = dirnamecmp(name, &dname, &matched);
> if le16_to_cpu(de[...].nameoff) is not monotonically increasing?  I.e.
> what's to prevent e.g. (unsigned)-1 ending up in dname.len?
> 
> Corrupted fs image shouldn't oops the kernel...

Yes, thanks for pointing out. :)
I will add more boundary check later before moving into fs/ directory...
erofs now is under dm-verity for our HUAWEI mobile phone, so it doesn't be corruptted.

I will add more checks and meta checksum later after EROFS productization successfully... :)

Thanks,
Gao Xiang
>