linux-kernel - Re: RFC: userspace exception fixups

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Date:   Wed, 7 Nov 2018 13:33:24 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
Cc:     "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, nhorman@...hat.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        shay.katz-zamir@...el.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@...hat.com>,
        adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org
Subject: Re: RFC: userspace exception fixups

On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 1:28 PM Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 03:26:16PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 06:17:30PM -0500, Rich Felker wrote:
> > > On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 11:02:11AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 10:41 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On 11/6/18 10:20 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > > > > I almost feel like the right solution is to call into SGX on its own
> > > > > > private stack or maybe even its own private address space.
> > > > >
> > > > > Yeah, I had the same gut feeling.  Couldn't the debugger even treat the
> > > > > enclave like its own "thread" with its own stack and its own set of
> > > > > registers and context?  That seems like a much more workable model than
> > > > > trying to weave it together with the EENTER context.
> > > >
> > > > So maybe the API should be, roughly
> > > >
> > > > sgx_exit_reason_t sgx_enter_enclave(pointer_to_enclave, struct
> > > > host_state *state);
> > > > sgx_exit_reason_t sgx_resume_enclave(same args);
> > > >
> > > > where host_state is something like:
> > > >
> > > > struct host_state {
> > > >   unsigned long bp, sp, ax, bx, cx, dx, si, di;
> > > > };
> > > >
> > > > and the values in host_state explicitly have nothing to do with the
> > > > actual host registers.  So, if you want to use the outcall mechanism,
> > > > you'd allocate some memory, point sp to that memory, call
> > > > sgx_enter_enclave(), and then read that memory to do the outcall.
> > > >
> > > > Actually implementing this would be distinctly nontrivial, and would
> > > > almost certainly need some degree of kernel help to avoid an explosion
> > > > when a signal gets delivered while we have host_state.sp loaded into
> > > > the actual SP register.  Maybe rseq could help with this?
> > > >
> > > > The ISA here is IMO not well thought through.
> > >
> > > Maybe I'm mistaken about some fundamentals here, but my understanding
> > > of SGX is that the whole point is that the host application and the
> > > code running in the enclave are mutually adversarial towards one
> > > another. Do any or all of the proposed protocols here account for this
> > > and fully protect the host application from malicious code in the
> > > enclave? It seems that having control over the register file on exit
> > > from the enclave is fundamentally problematic but I assume there must
> > > be some way I'm missing that this is fixed up.
> >
> > SGX provides protections for the enclave but not the other way around.
> > The kernel has all of its normal non-SGX protections in place, but the
> > enclave can certainly wreak havoc on its userspace process.  The basic
> > design idea is that the enclave is a specialized .so that gets extra
> > security protections but is still effectively part of the overall
> > application, e.g. it has full access to its host userspace process'
> > virtual memory.
>
> In that case it seems like the only way to use SGX that's not a gaping
> security hole is to run the SGX enclave in its own fully-seccomp (or
> equivalent) process, with no host application in the same address
> space. Since the host application can't see the contents of the
> enclave to make any determination of whether it's safe to run, running
> it in the same address space only makes sense if the cpu provides
> protection against unwanted accesses to the host's memory from the
> enclave -- and according to you, it doesn't.
>

I think the theory is that the enclave is shipped with the host application.

That being said, a way to run the enclave in an address space that has
basically nothing else (except an ENCLU instruction as a trampoline)
would be quite nice.