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Message-Id: <20181108215140.117551360@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 13:52:48 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 19/34] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
4.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
commit 9ae24af3669111d418242caec8dd4ebd9ba26860 upstream.
num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
fsg_opts->common->luns
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@
#include <linux/usb/gadget.h>
#include <linux/usb/composite.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include "configfs.h"
@@ -3171,6 +3173,7 @@ static struct config_group *fsg_lun_make
fsg_opts = to_fsg_opts(&group->cg_item);
if (num >= FSG_MAX_LUNS)
return ERR_PTR(-ERANGE);
+ num = array_index_nospec(num, FSG_MAX_LUNS);
mutex_lock(&fsg_opts->lock);
if (fsg_opts->refcnt || fsg_opts->common->luns[num]) {
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