[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20181109123204.GA11583@kroah.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 04:32:04 -0800
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...roid.com>
Cc: tkjos@...gle.com, arve@...roid.com, devel@...verdev.osuosl.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, maco@...gle.com,
stable@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...roid.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live
buffer
On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 03:55:32PM -0800, Todd Kjos wrote:
> Malicious code can attempt to free buffers using the
> BC_FREE_BUFFER ioctl to binder. There are protections
> against a user freeing a buffer while in use by the
> kernel, however there was a window where BC_FREE_BUFFER
> could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that
> was not completely initialized. This resulted in a
> use-after-free detected by KASAN with a malicious
> test program.
>
> This window is closed by setting the buffer's
> allow_user_free attribute to 0 when the buffer
> is allocated or when the user has previously
> freed it instead of waiting for the caller
> to set it. The problem was that when the struct
> buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale
> and set to 1 allowing a free to go through.
>
> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
> Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@...roid.com>
No "stable" tag here? Any idea how far back the stable backporting
should go, if any?
thanks,
greg k-h
Powered by blists - more mailing lists