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Message-ID: <20181112082013.GA9307@infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 00:20:13 -0800
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] SG_IO command filtering via sysfs
On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:42:42AM -0500, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> It really depends on the security model being used on a particular
> system. I can easily imagine scenarios where userspace is allowed
> full access to the device with respect to read/write/open, but the
> security model doesn't want to allow access to various SCSI commands
> such as firmware upload commands, TCG commads, the
> soon-to-be-standardized Zone Activation Commands (which allow dynamic
> conversion of HDD recording modes between CMR and SMR), etc.
Well, that's what we have the security_file_ioctl() LSM hook for so that
your security model can arbitrate access to ioctls.
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