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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhT=9mtRgoudbaxESpHM4+f7Go_oW_H7ek3Fs0pTLbLz3g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 15:13:28 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: cai@....us
Cc: omosnace@...hat.com, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
richard_c_haines@...nternet.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: check length properly in SCTP bind hook
On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 2:20 PM Qian Cai <cai@....us> wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-11-13 at 16:16 +0100, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > selinux_sctp_bind_connect() must verify if the address buffer has
> > sufficient length before accessing the 'sa_family' field. See
> > __sctp_connect() for a similar check.
> >
> > The length of the whole address ('len') is already checked in the
> > callees.
> >
> > Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@....us>
> > Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
> > Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 4.17+
> > Cc: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@....us>
Thanks guys. I'm in the process of building a test kernel right now,
assuming everything else passes (I can't see why this change would
cause a problem) I'll send this up to Linus.
> > ---
> > Hi,
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 8:39 PM Qian Cai <cai@....us> wrote:
> > > Running the trinity fuzzer on the latest mainline (rc2) generates this,
> > >
> > > [15029.879626] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in
> > > selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x60/0x150
> > > [15029.887275] Read of size 2 at addr ffff801ec53c5080 by task trinity-
> > > main/18081
> > > [15029.887294]
> > > [15029.887304] CPU: 28 PID: 18081 Comm: trinity-main Tainted:
> > > G W OE 4.20.0-rc2+ #15
> > > [15029.887311] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.50
> > > 06/01/2018
> > > [15000.084786] [15029.887320] Call trace:
> > > [15029.915511] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2c8
> > > [15029.920046] show_stack+0x24/0x30
> > > [15029.923367] dump_stack+0x118/0x19c
> > > [15029.927539] print_address_description+0x68/0x2a0
> > > [15029.932245] kasan_report+0x1b4/0x348
> > > [15029.938760] __asan_load2+0x7c/0xa0
> > > [15029.945098] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x60/0x150
> > >
> > > [15029.950571] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90
> > > [15029.955493] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x68/0x128 [sctp]
> > > [15029.960943] sctp_setsockopt+0x764/0x2928 [sctp]
> > > [15029.965564] sock_common_setsockopt+0x6c/0x80
> > > [15029.969923] __arm64_sys_setsockopt+0x13c/0x1f0
> > > [15029.974456] el0_svc_handler+0xd4/0x198
> > > [15029.978293] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
> > > [15029.981174]
> > > [15029.982667] Allocated by task 18081:
> > > [15029.986245] kasan_kmalloc.part.1+0x40/0x108
> > > [15029.990517] kasan_kmalloc+0xb4/0xc8
> > > [15029.994094] __kmalloc_node+0x1c4/0x638
> > > [15029.997933] kvmalloc_node+0x98/0xa8
> > > [15030.001511] vmemdup_user+0x34/0x128
> > > [15030.005137] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x44/0x128 [sctp]
> > > [15030.010586] sctp_setsockopt+0x764/0x2928 [sctp]
> > > [15030.015205] sock_common_setsockopt+0x6c/0x80
> > > [15030.019564] __arm64_sys_setsockopt+0x13c/0x1f0
> > > [15030.024096] el0_svc_handler+0xd4/0x198
> > > [15030.027933] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
> > > [15030.030814]
> > > [15030.032306] Freed by task 3025:
> > > [15030.035451] __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x228
> > > [15030.039548] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
> > > [15030.043299] kfree+0x114/0x408
> > > [15030.046357] selinux_sk_free_security+0x38/0x48
> > > [15030.050888] security_sk_free+0x3c/0x58
> > > [15030.054727] __sk_destruct+0x3e8/0x570
> > > [15030.058478] sk_destruct+0x4c/0x58
> > > [15030.061881] __sk_free+0x68/0x138
> > > [15030.065197] sk_free+0x3c/0x48
> > > [15030.068255] unix_release_sock+0x4a8/0x550
> > > [15030.072353] unix_release+0x34/0x50
> > > [15030.075843] __sock_release+0x74/0x110
> > > [15030.079593] sock_close+0x24/0x38
> > > [15030.082913] __fput+0x1b8/0x368
> > > [15030.086055] ____fput+0x20/0x30
> > > [15030.089199] task_work_run+0x14c/0x1a8
> > > [15030.092951] do_notify_resume+0x1e4/0x200
> > > [15030.096961] work_pending+0x8/0x14
> > > [15030.100363]
> > > [15030.101856] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff801ec53c5080
> > > [15030.101856] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
> > > [15030.114376] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> > > [15030.114376] 128-byte region [ffff801ec53c5080, ffff801ec53c5100)
> > > [15030.125939] The buggy address belongs to the page:
> > > [15030.130732] page:ffff7fe007b14f00 count:1 mapcount:0
> > > mapping:ffff8016c0010480 index:0x0
> > > [15030.138738] flags: 0x5fffff0000000200(slab)
> > > [15030.142926] raw: 5fffff0000000200 ffff7fe007980608 ffff801ec000fd60
> > > ffff8016c0010480
> > > [15030.150671] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000660066 00000001ffffffff
> > > 0000000000000000
> > > [15030.158413] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> > > [15030.163984]
> > > [15030.165476] Memory state around the buggy address:
> > > [15030.170269] ffff801ec53c4f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > fc fc
> > > [15030.177491] ffff801ec53c5000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > fc fc
> > > [15030.184714] >ffff801ec53c5080: 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > fc fc
> > > [15030.191934] ^
> > > [15030.195164] ffff801ec53c5100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > fc fc
> > > [15030.202386] ffff801ec53c5180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > fc fc
> > > [15030.209607]
> > > ==================================================================
> > > [15030.216828] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
> >
> > I think I found the cause - Qian, can you test this patch if it fixes
> > the problem?
> >
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index 7ce683259357..a67459eb62d5 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -5318,6 +5318,9 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk,
> > int optname,
> > addr_buf = address;
> >
> > while (walk_size < addrlen) {
> > + if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > addr = addr_buf;
> > switch (addr->sa_family) {
> > case AF_UNSPEC:
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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