linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/1] stackleak: Disable function tracing and kprobes for stackleak

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Message-Id: <20181113102332.00a97f983a2b361328fab9af@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 13 Nov 2018 10:23:32 -0800
From:   Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To:     Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
Cc:     kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
        Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] stackleak: Disable function tracing and kprobes for
 stackleak_erase()

On Tue, 13 Nov 2018 00:08:48 +0300
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote:

> The stackleak_erase() function is called on the trampoline stack at the end
> of syscall. This stack is not big enough for ftrace and kprobes operations,
> e.g. it can be exhausted if we use kprobe_events for stackleak_erase().
> 
> So let's disable function tracing and kprobes for stackleak_erase().
> 
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>

Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>

Thank you!

> ---
>  kernel/stackleak.c | 4 +++-
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
> index e428929..08cb57e 100644
> --- a/kernel/stackleak.c
> +++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>   */
>  
>  #include <linux/stackleak.h>
> +#include <linux/kprobes.h>
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
>  #include <linux/jump_label.h>
> @@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>  #define skip_erasing()	false
>  #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
>  
> -asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
> +asmlinkage void notrace stackleak_erase(void)
>  {
>  	/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
>  	unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
>  	/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
>  	current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
>  }
> +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(stackleak_erase);
>  
>  void __used stackleak_track_stack(void)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.7.4
> 


-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>