linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 10/17] prmem: documentation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 13 Nov 2018 20:33:41 +0200
From:   Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
CC:     Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...il.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
        "Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/17] prmem: documentation

I forgot one sentence :-(

On 13/11/2018 20:31, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> On 13/11/2018 19:47, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
>> For general rare-writish stuff, I don't think we want IRQs running
>> with them mapped anywhere for write.  For AVC and IMA, I'm less sure.
> 
> Why would these be less sensitive?
> 
> But I see a big difference between my initial implementation and this one.
> 
> In my case, by using a shared mapping, visible to all cores, freezing
> the core that is performing the write would have exposed the writable
> mapping to a potential attack run from another core.
> 
> If the mapping is private to the core performing the write, even if it
> is frozen, it's much harder to figure out what it had mapped and where,
> from another core.
> 
> To access that mapping, the attack should be performed from the ISR, I
> think.

Unless the secondary mapping is also available to other cores, through
the shared mm_struct ?

--
igor