linux-kernel - [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL

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Message-Id: <20181114215509.163600-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 14 Nov 2018 13:55:09 -0800
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To:     David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...glemail.com>,
        Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
        Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@...hat.com>,
        linux-input@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@...gle.com>,
        syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>

When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory.  Alternatively,
information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write
to the file descriptor.  Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases.

No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and
UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to
UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely.

Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.

Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # v3.6+
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
---
 drivers/hid/uhid.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
index 3c55073136064..051639c09f728 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/hid.h>
@@ -722,6 +723,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 
 	switch (uhid->input_buf.type) {
 	case UHID_CREATE:
+		/*
+		 * 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is
+		 * copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated
+		 * privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write().
+		 */
+		if (file->f_cred != current_cred() || uaccess_kernel()) {
+			pr_err_once("UHID_CREATE from different security context by process %d (%s), this is not allowed.\n",
+				    task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
+			ret = -EACCES;
+			goto unlock;
+		}
 		ret = uhid_dev_create(uhid, &uhid->input_buf);
 		break;
 	case UHID_CREATE2:
-- 
2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog