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Message-ID: <fa3ed175-13a3-bedf-ebf9-ddf46a2decd5@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 10:45:11 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] SG_IO command filtering via sysfs
On 16/11/18 10:32, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 11:17:29AM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> Well, that's what we have the security_file_ioctl() LSM hook for so that
>>> your security model can arbitrate access to ioctls.
>>
>> Doesn't that have TOC-TOU races by design?
>
> If you want to look at the command - yes. If you just want to filter
> read vs write vs ioctl, no.
Yeah, but looking at the command is what Ted wants. The thing that we
did in RHEL was a single sysfs bool that allows unfiltered access,
because it was sort of enough and made the delta very small. But for
upstream I want to do it right, even if that means learning all that
new-fangled BPF stuff. :)
>> Also, what about SG_IO giving write access to files that are only opened
>> read-only (and only have read permissions)?
>
> Allowing SG_IO on read-only permissions sounds like a reall bad idea,
> filtering or not.
I would even agree, however it's allowed right now and I would be
surprised if no one was relying on it in good faith ("I'm just doing an
INQUIRY, why do I need to open O_RDWR"). And indeed:
$ sudo chmod a+r /dev/sda
$ strace -e openat sg_inq /dev/sda
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/sda", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 3
^^^^^^^^
So it would be a regression.
Paolo
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