linux-kernel - Re: [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes

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Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1811171044510.21108@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date:   Sat, 17 Nov 2018 10:47:22 +0100 (CET)
From:   Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To:     Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app
 protection modes

On Fri, 16 Nov 2018, Tim Chen wrote:

> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 81d1d5a..9c306e3 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -4215,6 +4215,26 @@
>  			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
>  			spectre_v2=auto.
>  
> +	spectre_v2_app2app=
> +			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
> +		        application to application (indirect branch speculation)
> +			vulnerability.
> +
> +			off    - Unconditionally disable mitigations
> +			lite   - Protect tasks which have requested restricted
> +				 indirect branch speculation via the
> +				 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctl(). 

Don't we also want to do the same for SECCOMP processess, analogically how 
we do it for SSBD?

Thanks,

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs