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Message-ID: <20181118215930.GA11126@1wt.eu>
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 22:59:30 +0100
From: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: STIBP by default.. Revert?
On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 10:49:44PM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> odds are that people
> who don't care about spectrev2 already have 'nospectre_v2' on their
> command-line, so they are fine as well.
FWIW in our appliances, we never modify the boot loader's cmdline
in field, we only provide new kernel+rootfs images. We've however
disabled the config options for all this class of vulnerabilities.
As long as it remains possible to disable the new ones using config
options only, that's not an issue for me.
Cheers,
Willy
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