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Message-ID: <CA+8MBbKqeAFjoqq4G-A8pjDdHoVvXqG1Jv+Q4DTu2ZgZ1Gxvjg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 14:36:02 -0800
From: Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, jpoimboe@...hat.com,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>, dwmw@...zon.co.uk,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com,
casey.schaufler@...el.com,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
X86-ML <x86@...nel.org>, stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: STIBP by default.. Revert?
On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 2:19 PM Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org> wrote:
> Which gets us back to Tim's fixup patch. Do you still prefer the revert,
> given the existence of that? I think that if Tim's fixup makes it through
> (it's currently missing SECCOMP handling, but that is trivial to add on
> top), it might be the best compromise. We'd also have have to make IBPB
> obey it to be consistent (and get even a few more % of performance back),
> but that's easy as well.
+1 for Tim's patch. That make us more consistent with how we handled
L1TF (giving the system owner a control knob to decide whether they
want this level of fixup, based on their own analysis of their vulnerability).
-Tony
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