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Message-ID: <871s7i0wkl.fsf@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 15:56:10 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"the arch\/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: STIBP by default.. Revert?
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
> On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 2:17 PM Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org> wrote:
>> Which gets us back to Tim's fixup patch. Do you still prefer the revert,
>> given the existence of that?
>
> I don't think the code needs to be reverted, but the *behavior* of
> just unconditionally enabling STIBP needs to be reverted.
Actually I think it should be reverted. Yes of course opt-in
is needed.
But also when you opt-in it doesn't make sense to set STIBP
when the sibling is running the same security context, which
is actually a common case. So to even use it properly you would
need some scheduler support to detect these cases and only
enable it then with opt-in. These patches didn't even try to tackle
this problem.
-Andi
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