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Date:   Mon, 19 Nov 2018 12:27:02 -0700
From:   Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>
To:     Jerome Glisse <jglisse@...hat.com>
Cc:     Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>,
        Kenneth Lee <liguozhu@...ilicon.com>,
        Tim Sell <timothy.sell@...sys.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@...wei.com>, zhangfei.gao@...mail.com,
        linuxarm@...wei.com, haojian.zhuang@...aro.org,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Hao Fang <fanghao11@...wei.com>,
        Gavin Schenk <g.schenk@...elmann.de>,
        RDMA mailing list <linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org>,
        Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@...ilicon.com>,
        Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>,
        Uwe Kleine-König 
        <u.kleine-koenig@...gutronix.de>,
        David Kershner <david.kershner@...sys.com>,
        Kenneth Lee <nek.in.cn@...il.com>,
        Johan Hovold <johan@...nel.org>,
        Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@...e-electrons.com>,
        Sagar Dharia <sdharia@...eaurora.org>,
        Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>, guodong.xu@...aro.org,
        linux-netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Vinod Koul <vkoul@...nel.org>,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@...b.com>,
        Sanyog Kale <sanyog.r.kale@...el.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        linux-accelerators@...ts.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [RFCv3 PATCH 1/6] uacce: Add documents for WarpDrive/uacce

On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 02:17:21PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 11:53:33AM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 01:42:16PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > > On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 11:27:52AM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 11:48:54AM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > > Just to comment on this, any infiniband driver which use umem and do
> > > > > not have ODP (here ODP for me means listening to mmu notifier so all
> > > > > infiniband driver except mlx5) will be affected by same issue AFAICT.
> > > > > 
> > > > > AFAICT there is no special thing happening after fork() inside any of
> > > > > those driver. So if parent create a umem mr before fork() and program
> > > > > hardware with it then after fork() the parent might start using new
> > > > > page for the umem range while the old memory is use by the child. The
> > > > > reverse is also true (parent using old memory and child new memory)
> > > > > bottom line you can not predict which memory the child or the parent
> > > > > will use for the range after fork().
> > > > > 
> > > > > So no matter what you consider the child or the parent, what the hw
> > > > > will use for the mr is unlikely to match what the CPU use for the
> > > > > same virtual address. In other word:
> > > > > 
> > > > > Before fork:
> > > > >     CPU parent: virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xCAFE
> > > > >     HARDWARE:   virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xCAFE
> > > > > 
> > > > > Case 1:
> > > > >     CPU parent: virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xCAFE
> > > > >     CPU child:  virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xDEAD
> > > > >     HARDWARE:   virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xCAFE
> > > > > 
> > > > > Case 2:
> > > > >     CPU parent: virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xBEEF
> > > > >     CPU child:  virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xCAFE
> > > > >     HARDWARE:   virtual addr ptr1 -> physical address = 0xCAFE
> > > > 
> > > > IIRC this is solved in IB by automatically calling
> > > > madvise(MADV_DONTFORK) before creating the MR.
> > > > 
> > > > MADV_DONTFORK
> > > >   .. This is useful to prevent copy-on-write semantics from changing the
> > > >   physical location of a page if the parent writes to it after a
> > > >   fork(2) ..
> > > 
> > > This would work around the issue but this is not transparent ie
> > > range marked with DONTFORK no longer behave as expected from the
> > > application point of view.
> > 
> > Do you know what the difference is? The man page really gives no
> > hint..
> > 
> > Does it sometimes unmap the pages during fork?
> 
> It is handled in kernel/fork.c look for DONTCOPY, basicaly it just
> leave empty page table in the child process so child will have to
> fault in new page. This also means that child will get 0 as initial
> value for all memory address under DONTCOPY/DONTFORK which breaks
> application expectation of what fork() do.

Hum, I wonder why this API was selected then..

> > I actually wonder if the kernel is a bit broken here, we have the same
> > problem with O_DIRECT and other stuff, right?
> 
> No it is not, O_DIRECT is fine. The only corner case i can think
> of with O_DIRECT is one thread launching an O_DIRECT that write
> to private anonymous memory (other O_DIRECT case do not matter)
> while another thread call fork() then what the child get can be
> undefined ie either it get the data before the O_DIRECT finish
> or it gets the result of the O_DIRECT. But this is realy what
> you should expect when doing such thing without synchronization.
> 
> So O_DIRECT is fine.

?? How can O_DIRECT be fine but RDMA not? They use exactly the same
get_user_pages flow, right? Can we do what O_DIRECT does in RDMA and
be fine too?

AFAIK the only difference is the length of the race window. You'd have
to fork and fault during the shorter time O_DIRECT has get_user_pages
open.

> > Really, if I have a get_user_pages FOLL_WRITE on a page and we fork,
> > then shouldn't the COW immediately be broken during the fork?
> > 
> > The kernel can't guarentee that an ongoing DMA will not write to those
> > pages, and it breaks the fork semantic to write to both processes.
> 
> Fixing that would incur a high cost: need to grow struct page, need
> to copy potentialy gigabyte of memory during fork() ... this would be
> a serious performance regression for many folks just to work around an
> abuse of device driver. So i don't think anything on that front would
> be welcome.

Why? Keep track in each mm if there are any active get_user_pages
FOLL_WRITE pages in the mm, if yes then sweep the VMAs and fix the
issue for the FOLL_WRITE pages.

John is already working on being able to detect pages under GUP, so it
seems like a small step..

Since nearly all cases of fork don't have a GUP FOLL_WRITE active
there would be no performance hit.

> umem without proper ODP and VFIO are the only bad user i know of (for
> VFIO you can argue that it is part of the API contract and thus that
> it is not an abuse but it is not spell out loud in documentation). I
> have been trying to push back on any people trying to push thing that
> would make the same mistake or at least making sure they understand
> what is happening.

It is something we have to live with and support for the foreseeable
future.

> What really need to happen is people fixing their hardware and do the
> right thing (good software engineer versus evil hardware engineer ;))

Even ODP is no pancea, there are performance problems. What we really
need is CAPI like stuff, so you will tell Intel to redesign the CPU??
:)

Jason

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