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Message-ID: <591a5109-ffef-b17f-38e3-12082d229451@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 15:39:19 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app
protection modes
On 11/19/18 3:01 PM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> Yes, it wouldn't make sense for having just one of those if a task
>> is worried about attack from user space.
>>
>> I'll document it.
> What? IBPB makes tons of sense even without STIBP.
I'm lost. :)
I don't think anyone is talking about using STIBP *everywhere* that IBPB
is in-use.
We're just guessing that, if anybody is paranoid enough to ask for IBPB,
*and* they have SMT, they almost certainly want STIBP too.
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