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Message-ID: <20181119034846.GA11333@1wt.eu>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 04:48:46 +0100
From: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: STIBP by default.. Revert?
On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 02:40:28PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> Tasks that want extra security will enable that via prctl interface or
> making themselves non-dumpable.
Well, you need to be careful regarding the last part of your option
above, because a number of network daemons become non-dumpable by
executing setuid() at boot, and certainly don't want to suffer a
performance loss as a side effect of wanting to become "normally"
secure. I'd suggest to use the prctl only so that it doesn't
randomly hit innocent applications that would only have as a last
resort to turn off reasonable security features to avoid this impact.
Regards,
Willy
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