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Message-ID: <20181120011726.GB13936@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 17:17:26 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app
protection modes
> I'm not taking that stuff without proper documentation.
Ok can you just revert Jiri's code then instead?
This is after all mainly an emergency fixup patch for that disaster,
which got fast tracked without any of these considerations
which now suddenly appear. Requiring new documentation for old
for old existing code as part of emergency patches definitely seems to
be unwarranted scope creep.
> I complained about
> that vs. L1TF and got told that no sysadmin cares, but L1TF has shown that
> they care very much and appreciate proper documentation.
I suspect what they mainly want is a single global switch to turn it all off...
which we sadly lack.
-Andi
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