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Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 20:06:18 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
"WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
"SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 42/42] Revert "x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation"
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 233b9d7df0e114c7e7c3674559fb0fc41ada3e8f which is
commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream.
It's not ready for the stable trees as there are major slowdowns
involved with this patch.
Reported-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 57 ++++-----------------------------------------
kernel/cpu.c | 11 --------
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -35,10 +35,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
-/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
-u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+/*
+ * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
+ * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
+ */
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
/*
* The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
@@ -323,46 +325,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
return cmd;
}
-static bool stibp_needed(void)
-{
- if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
- return false;
-
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static void update_stibp_msr(void *info)
-{
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-}
-
-void arch_smt_update(void)
-{
- u64 mask;
-
- if (!stibp_needed())
- return;
-
- mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
- mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
- if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
- mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
- else
- mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
- if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) {
- pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n",
- cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ?
- "Enabling" : "Disabling");
- x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
- on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
- }
- mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
-}
-
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -462,9 +424,6 @@ specv2_set_mode:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
-
- /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
- arch_smt_update();
}
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -855,8 +814,6 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
- int ret;
-
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
@@ -874,12 +831,10 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
- ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
- (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
- return ret;
case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2026,12 +2026,6 @@ static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsi
kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE);
}
-/*
- * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug
- * should override this.
- */
-void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { };
-
static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
{
int cpu, ret = 0;
@@ -2058,10 +2052,8 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_
*/
cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu);
}
- if (!ret) {
+ if (!ret)
cpu_smt_control = ctrlval;
- arch_smt_update();
- }
cpu_maps_update_done();
return ret;
}
@@ -2072,7 +2064,6 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
cpu_maps_update_begin();
cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
- arch_smt_update();
for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
/* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */
if (cpu_online(cpu) || !node_online(cpu_to_node(cpu)))
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