[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wib4jeM1HFMopLGRaVFSJY-a1Wip3rY-q5ko+-BwvX7Zw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:32:16 -0800
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, thomas.lendacky@....com,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, dave.hansen@...el.com,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
"Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan@...ux.intel.com>, jcm@...hat.com,
longman9394@...il.com, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
david.c.stewart@...el.com,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v6 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict
speculation on non-dumpable task
On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 9:41 AM Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> When STIBP is on, it will prevent not only untrusted code from attacking,
> but also trusted code from getting attacked. So non-dumpable task running
> with STIBP will protect itself from attacks from code running on sibling CPU.
I understand.
You didn't read my email about why "dumpable" is not sensible.
Linus
Powered by blists - more mailing lists