linux-kernel - Re: [patch 24/24] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 app to app protection mode

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Date:   Wed, 21 Nov 2018 18:24:32 -0800
From:   Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@...el.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 24/24] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 app to app
 protection mode

On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 09:14:54PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
> 
> If 'prctl' mode of app2app protection from spectre v2 is selected on the
> kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which restrict
> their indirect branch speculation via prctl.
> 
> SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
> makes sense to prevent spectre v2 application to application attacks as
> well.

Will need to add this chunk.

Thanks.

Tim

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index c4d010d..d070e84 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_app2app_cmd {
 	{ "off",	SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_NONE,	false },
 	{ "on",		SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_FORCE,	true  },
 	{ "prctl",	SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_PRCTL,	false },
+	{ "seccomp",	SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_CMD_SECCOMP,	false },
 };
 
 static void __init spec_v2_app_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)