Message-ID: <20181122154942.18262-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Date:   Thu, 22 Nov 2018 16:49:42 +0100
From:   Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
To:     <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
CC:     <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        <initramfs@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, <silviu.vlasceanu@...wei.com>,
        <dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com>, <takondra@...co.com>,
        <kamensky@...co.com>, <hpa@...or.com>, <arnd@...db.de>,
        <rob@...dley.net>, <james.w.mcmechan@...il.com>,
        Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH] fs: set xattrs in initramfs from regular files

Although rootfs (tmpfs) supports xattrs, they are not set due to the
limitation of the cpio format. A new format called 'newcx' was proposed to
overcome this limitation.

However, it looks like that adding a new format is not simple: 15 kernel
patches; user space tools must support the new format; mistakes made in the
past should be avoided; it is unclear whether the kernel should switch from
cpio to tar.

The aim of this patch is to provide the same functionality without
introducing a new format. The value of xattrs is placed in regular files
having the same file name as the files xattrs are added to, plus a
separator and the xattr name (<filename>.xattr-<xattr name>).

Example:

'/bin/cat.xattr-security.ima' is the name of a file containing the value of
the security.ima xattr to be added to /bin/cat.

At kernel initialization time, the kernel iterates over the rootfs
filesystem, and if it encounters files with the '.xattr-' separator, it
reads the content and adds the xattr to the file without the suffix.

This proposal requires that LSMs and IMA allow the read and setxattr
operations. This should not be a concern since: files with xattr values
are not parsed by the kernel; user space processes are not yet executed.

It would be possible to include all xattrs in the same file, but this
increases the risk of the kernel being compromised by parsing the content.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
---
 fs/Makefile        |   2 +-
 fs/readxattr.c     | 171 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h |   2 +
 init/main.c        |   1 +
 4 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 fs/readxattr.c

diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
index 293733f61594..738e1a4e4aff 100644
--- a/fs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ obj-y :=	open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \
 		attr.o bad_inode.o file.o filesystems.o namespace.o \
 		seq_file.o xattr.o libfs.o fs-writeback.o \
 		pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \
-		stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o
+		stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o readxattr.o
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_BLOCK),y)
 obj-y +=	buffer.o block_dev.o direct-io.o mpage.o
diff --git a/fs/readxattr.c b/fs/readxattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..01838f6f1e92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/readxattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: readxattr.c
+ *      Read extended attributes from regular files in the initial ram disk
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define SETXATTR_FILENAME ".setxattr"
+#define FILENAME_XATTR_SEP ".xattr-"
+
+
+struct readdir_callback {
+	struct dir_context ctx;
+	struct path *path;
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(dir_list);
+
+struct dir_path {
+	struct list_head next;
+	struct path path;
+};
+
+static int __init read_set_xattr(struct dir_context *__ctx, const char *name,
+				 int namelen, loff_t offset, u64 ino,
+				 unsigned int d_type)
+{
+	struct readdir_callback *ctx = container_of(__ctx, typeof(*ctx), ctx);
+	struct path *dir = ctx->path, source_path, target_path;
+	char filename[NAME_MAX + 1], *xattrname, *separator;
+	struct dir_path *subdir;
+	struct file *file;
+	void *datap;
+	loff_t size;
+	int result;
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, ".") || !strcmp(name, ".."))
+		return 0;
+
+	result = vfs_path_lookup(dir->dentry, dir->mnt, name, 0, &source_path);
+	if (result)
+		return 0;
+
+	size = i_size_read(source_path.dentry->d_inode);
+	if (size > XATTR_SIZE_MAX)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (source_path.dentry->d_inode->i_sb != dir->dentry->d_inode->i_sb)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(source_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
+	    !S_ISDIR(source_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (S_ISREG(source_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+		separator = strstr(name, FILENAME_XATTR_SEP);
+		if (!separator)
+			goto out;
+
+		xattrname = separator + sizeof(FILENAME_XATTR_SEP) - 1;
+		if (strlen(xattrname) > XATTR_NAME_MAX)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		subdir = kmalloc(sizeof(*subdir), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (subdir) {
+			subdir->path.dentry = source_path.dentry;
+			subdir->path.mnt = source_path.mnt;
+
+			list_add(&subdir->next, &dir_list);
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	file = dentry_open(&source_path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+	if (IS_ERR(file))
+		goto out;
+
+	result = kernel_read_file(file, &datap, &size, 0, READING_XATTR);
+	if (result)
+		goto out_fput;
+
+	if (separator != name) {
+		snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.*s",
+			 (int)(namelen - strlen(separator)), name);
+
+		result = vfs_path_lookup(dir->dentry, dir->mnt, filename, 0,
+					&target_path);
+		if (result)
+			goto out_vfree;
+
+		inode_lock(target_path.dentry->d_inode);
+	} else {
+		target_path.dentry = dir->dentry;
+		target_path.mnt = dir->mnt;
+	}
+
+	__vfs_setxattr_noperm(target_path.dentry, xattrname, datap, size, 0);
+
+	if (separator != name) {
+		inode_unlock(target_path.dentry->d_inode);
+		path_put(&target_path);
+	}
+out_vfree:
+	vfree(datap);
+out_fput:
+	fput(file);
+out:
+	path_put(&source_path);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __init set_xattrs_initrd(void)
+{
+	struct readdir_callback buf = {
+		.ctx.actor = read_set_xattr,
+	};
+
+	struct dir_path dir, *cur_dir;
+	struct path path;
+	struct file *file;
+	int result;
+
+	result = kern_path(SETXATTR_FILENAME, 0, &path);
+	if (result)
+		return;
+
+	path_put(&path);
+
+	result = kern_path("/", 0, &dir.path);
+	if (result)
+		return;
+
+	list_add(&dir.next, &dir_list);
+
+	while (!list_empty(&dir_list)) {
+		cur_dir = list_first_entry(&dir_list, typeof(*cur_dir), next);
+
+		file = dentry_open(&cur_dir->path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+		if (file) {
+			buf.path = &cur_dir->path;
+			iterate_dir(file, &buf.ctx);
+			fput(file);
+		}
+
+		path_put(&cur_dir->path);
+		list_del(&cur_dir->next);
+
+		if (cur_dir != &dir)
+			kfree(cur_dir);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_xattrs_initrd);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index c95c0807471f..b04edc1c32e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2894,6 +2894,7 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 	id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs)	\
 	id(POLICY, security-policy)		\
 	id(X509_CERTIFICATE, x509-certificate)	\
+	id(XATTR, xattr)	\
 	id(MAX_ID, )
 
 #define __fid_enumify(ENUM, dummy) READING_ ## ENUM,
@@ -3156,6 +3157,7 @@ const char *simple_get_link(struct dentry *, struct inode *,
 extern const struct inode_operations simple_symlink_inode_operations;
 
 extern int iterate_dir(struct file *, struct dir_context *);
+extern void set_xattrs_initrd(void);
 
 extern int vfs_statx(int, const char __user *, int, struct kstat *, u32);
 extern int vfs_statx_fd(unsigned int, struct kstat *, u32, unsigned int);
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index ee147103ba1b..a2f63bc8f9d4 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -1180,5 +1180,6 @@ static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void)
 	 */
 
 	integrity_load_keys();
+	set_xattrs_initrd();
 	load_default_modules();
 }
-- 
2.17.1

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