linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

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Message-ID: <20181126193906.GA32327@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 26 Nov 2018 11:39:06 -0800
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@...ellic.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        nhorman@...hat.com, npmccallum@...hat.com,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>, shay.katz-zamir@...el.com,
        haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, mark.shanahan@...el.com,
        Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@...el.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>, andy@...radead.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 01:24:54PM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 08:15:21AM -0800, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 05:15:08AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > > Malware would not necessarily need the Intel attestation service.
> > > Once access to the PROVISION bit is available, malware teams could
> > > simply build their own attestation service.
> 
> > AFAIK not possible as they wouldn't have access to the root
> > provisioning key. Can be confirmed from the SDM's key derivation
> > table (41-56).
> 
> What provisioning and attestation is all about is establishing an
> identity binding for a platform in question.  The standard Intel
> service binds the identity of a platform to an EPID private key.
> 
> With access to the SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_BIT an enclave can generate a
> perpetual identity for a platform based on the identity modulus
> signature (MRSIGNER) of the key that signs the signature structure of
> the enclave.  Without access to the root provisioning key a security
> quorum or group has to be implemented via a subscription or enrollment
> model but that is arguably not much of an obstacle.
> 
> That is pretty much the way standard botware works now.
> 
> Without provisions for cryptographically secure authorization and
> policy enforcement in the driver, we will be creating infrastructure
> for a new generation of botware/malware whose mothership will know
> that a participating platform is running with full confidentiality and
> integrity protections.

OK, I think I got what you mean.

With free access to the provision the bot net controller could be sure
that a node is running inside an enclave. Is this what you are worried
about? Please correct if not or even if there is a slight drift on what
you are trying to state.

/Jarkko