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Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1811271350590.21108@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 13:52:23 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@...el.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
On Tue, 27 Nov 2018, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> > That's racy and does not prevent the situation because the TIF flags are
> > updated befor the UPDATE bit is set.
>
> > So __speculation_ctrl_update() might see the new bits, but not
> > TIF_SPEC_UPDATE.
>
> Hm, right, scratch that. We'd need to do that before updating TIF_SPEC_IB
> in task_update_spec_tif(), but that has the opposite ordering issue.
I think this should do it (not yet fully tested).
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Always properly update SPEC_CTRL MSR for remote SECCOMP tasks
If seccomp task is setting TIF_SPEC_IB for a task running on remote CPU,
the value of TIF_SPEC_IB becomes out-of-sync with the actual MSR value on
that CPU.
This becomes a problem when such task then context switches to another
task that has TIF_SPEC_IB set, as in such case the value of SPEC_CTRL MSR
is not updated and the next task starts running with stale value of
SPEC_CTRL, potentially unprotected by STIBP.
Fix that by "queuing" the needed flags update in 'spec_ctrl' shadow
variable, and populating proper TI flags with it on context switch to the
task that has the TIF_SPEC_UPDATE flag (indicating that syncing is
necessary) set.
Reported-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 6d201699c651..001b053067d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct task_struct;
struct thread_info {
unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */
+ unsigned long spec_flags; /* spec flags to sync on ctxsw */
u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */
};
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
#define TIF_SPEC_IB 9 /* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */
+#define TIF_SPEC_UPDATE 10 /* SPEC_CTRL MSR sync needed on CTXSW */
#define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of userspace return */
#define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */
#define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13 /* pending live patching update */
@@ -112,6 +114,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
#define _TIF_SPEC_IB (1 << TIF_SPEC_IB)
+#define _TIF_SPEC_UPDATE (1 << TIF_SPEC_UPDATE)
#define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY (1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
#define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)
#define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
@@ -155,7 +158,7 @@ struct thread_info {
* Avoid calls to __switch_to_xtra() on UP as STIBP is not evaluated.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-# define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE | _TIF_SPEC_IB)
+# define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE | _TIF_SPEC_IB | _TIF_SPEC_UPDATE)
#else
# define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE)
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b5d2b36618a5..679946135789 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -761,9 +761,11 @@ static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk, int tifbit, bool on)
bool update;
if (on)
- update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, tifbit);
+ update = !test_and_set_bit(tifbit,
+ &task_thread_info(tsk)->spec_flags);
else
- update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, tifbit);
+ update = test_and_clear_bit(tifbit,
+ &task_thread_info(tsk)->spec_flags);
/*
* Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current
@@ -772,9 +774,16 @@ static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk, int tifbit, bool on)
*
* This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's
* always the current task.
+ *
+ * If we are updating non-current SECCOMP task, set a flag for it to
+ * always perform the MSR sync on a first context switch to it, in order
+ * to make sure the TIF_SPEC_IB above is not out of sync with the MSR value.
*/
if (tsk == current && update)
speculation_ctrl_update_current();
+ else
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_UPDATE);
+
}
static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 3f5e351bdd37..6c4fcef52b19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -474,6 +474,21 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
tifn = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags);
tifp = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags);
+
+ /*
+ * SECCOMP tasks might have had their spec_ctrl flags updated during
+ * runtime from a different CPU.
+ *
+ * When switching to such a task, populate thread flags with the ones
+ * that have been temporarily saved in spec_flags by task_update_spec_tif()
+ * in order to make sure MSR value is always kept up to date.
+ *
+ * SECCOMP tasks never disable the mitigation for other threads, only enable.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP) &&
+ test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_SPEC_UPDATE))
+ tifp |= READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->spec_flags);
+
switch_to_bitmap(prev, next, tifp, tifn);
propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p);
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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