linux-kernel - Re: [patch V2 18/28] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control

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Message-ID: <b2442439-a3ea-00f6-955f-f0c5d99ec401@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:51:41 -0800
From:   Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc:     "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@...el.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [patch V2 18/28] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect
 branch speculation control

On 11/27/2018 09:25 AM, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> @@ -148,6 +148,10 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
>>  		    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
>>  			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
>>  
>> +		/* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
>> +		if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
>> +			hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
>> +
>>  		if (hostval != guestval) {
>>  			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
>>  			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
>> @@ -406,6 +406,11 @@ static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_up
>>  	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
>>  		msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
> 
> I did some quick testing and found my original logic was flawed. Since
> spec_ctrl_update_msr() can now be called for STIBP, an additional check
> is needed to set the SSBD MSR bit.
> 
> Both X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD and X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD cause
> X86_FEATURE_SSBD to be set. Before this patch, spec_ctrl_update_msr() was
> only called if X86_FEATURE_SSBD was set and one of the other SSBD features
> wasn't set. But now, STIBP can cause spec_ctrl_update_msr() to get called
> and cause the SSBD MSR bit to be set when it shouldn't (could result in
> a GP fault).
> 

I think it will be cleaner just to fold the msr update into
__speculation_ctrl_update to fix this issue.

Something like this perhaps.

Thanks.

Tim

---

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 3f5e351..614ec51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -398,25 +398,6 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn));
 }
 
-static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_update_msr(unsigned long tifn)
-{
-	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-
-	/*
-	 * If X86_FEATURE_SSBD is not set, the SSBD bit is not to be
-	 * touched.
-	 */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
-		msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
-
-	/* Only evaluate if conditional STIBP is enabled */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
-	    static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
-		msr |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
-
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
-}
-
 /*
  * Update the MSRs managing speculation control, during context switch.
  *
@@ -428,6 +409,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
 {
 	unsigned long tif_diff = tifp ^ tifn;
 	bool updmsr = false;
+	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 	/*
 	 * If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation
@@ -440,8 +422,10 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
 			amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
 		else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
 			amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
-		else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+		else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) {
 			updmsr  = true;
+			msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -449,11 +433,13 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
 	 * otherwise avoid the MSR write.
 	 */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
-	    static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+	    static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) {
 		updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SPEC_IB);
+		msr |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+	}
 
 	if (updmsr)
-		spec_ctrl_update_msr(tifn);
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
 }
 
 void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif)