Message-ID: <3e3e9338-9bf4-dbfd-e53d-ae26c39017c4@infradead.org>
Date:   Sun, 2 Dec 2018 19:28:55 -0800
From:   Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     dave.hansen@...el.com, sean.j.christopherson@...el.com,
        nhorman@...hat.com, npmccallum@...hat.com, serge.ayoun@...el.com,
        shay.katz-zamir@...el.com, haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com,
        andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
        kai.svahn@...el.com, mark.shanahan@...el.com, luto@...capital.net,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 22/23] x86/sgx: SGX documentation

Hi,
I have more editing comments below.


On 11/15/18 5:01 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Documentation of the features of the Software Guard eXtensions used
> by the Linux kernel and basic design choices for the core and driver
> and functionality.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/index.rst         |   1 +
>  Documentation/x86/index.rst     |   8 ++
>  Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst | 233 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 242 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/index.rst
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst

> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst b/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f51b43f9e125
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
> +===================
> +Intel(R) SGX driver
> +===================
> +
> +Introduction
> +============
> +
> +Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to
> +set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is
> +disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
> +In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It protects the

                                   provides an inverted sandbox.

> +application from a malicious host.
> +
> +You can tell if your CPU supports SGX by looking into ``/proc/cpuinfo``:
> +
> +	``cat /proc/cpuinfo  | grep sgx``
> +
> +Overview of SGX
> +===============
> +
> +SGX has a set of data structures to maintain information about the enclaves and
> +their security properties. BIOS reserves a fixed size region of physical memory
> +for these structures by setting Processor Reserved Memory Range Registers
> +(PRMRR).
> +
> +This memory range is protected from outside access by the CPU and all the data
> +coming in and out of the CPU package is encrypted by a key that is generated for
> +each boot cycle.
> +
> +Enclaves execute in ring-3 in a special enclave submode using pages from the

                       ring 3

> +reserved memory range. A fixed logical address range for the enclave is reserved
> +by ENCLS(ECREATE), a leaf instruction used to create enclaves. It is referred in

                                                                        referred to in

> +the documentation commonly as the ELRANGE.
> +
> +Every memory access to the ELRANGE is asserted by the CPU. If the CPU is not
> +executing in the enclave mode inside the enclave, #GP is raised. On the other
> +hand, enclave code can make memory accesses both inside and outside of the
> +ELRANGE.
> +
> +Enclave can only execute code inside the ELRANGE. Instructions that may cause

   An enclave can only

> +VMEXIT, IO instructions and instructions that require a privilege change are
> +prohibited inside the enclave. Interrupts and exceptions always cause enclave

                                                            always cause an enclave

> +to exit and jump to an address outside the enclave given when the enclave is
> +entered by using the leaf instruction ENCLS(EENTER).
> +
> +Protected memory
> +----------------
> +
> +Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
> +    Physical pages used with enclaves that are protected by the CPU from
> +    unauthorized access.
> +
> +Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)
> +    A database that describes the properties and state of the pages e.g. their
> +    permissions or to which enclave they belong to.

Drop one of those "to" words (either one).

> +
> +Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) integrity tree
> +    Autonomously updated integrity tree. The root of the tree located in on-die
> +    SRAM.
> +
> +EPC data types
> +--------------
> +
> +SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
> +    Describes the global properties of an enclave. Will not be mapped to the
> +    ELRANGE.
> +
> +Regular (REG)
> +    These pages contain code and data.
> +
> +Thread Control Structure (TCS)
> +    The pages that define the entry points inside an enclave. An enclave can
> +    only be entered through these entry points and each can host a single
> +    hardware thread at a time.
> +
> +Version Array (VA)
> +   The pages contain 64-bit version numbers for pages that have been swapped
> +   outside the enclave. Each page has the capacity of 512 version numbers.
> +
> +Launch control
> +--------------
> +
> +To launch an enclave, two structures must be provided for ENCLS(EINIT):
> +
> +1. **SIGSTRUCT:** signed measurement of the enclave binary.
> +2. **EINITTOKEN:** a cryptographic token CMAC-signed with a AES256-key called

                                                        with an

> +   *launch key*, which is re-generated for each boot cycle.

(prefer)                     regenerated

> +
> +The CPU holds a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key inside
> +IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs. Enclaves with a SIGSTRUCT that is signed with this
> +key do not require a valid EINITTOKEN and can be authorized with special
> +privileges. One of those privileges is ability to acquire the launch key with
> +ENCLS(EGETKEY).
> +
> +**IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL[17]** is used by the BIOS configure whether

                                        by the BIOS to configure whether

> +IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH MSRs are read-only or read-write before locking the
> +feature control register and handing over control to the operating system.
> +
> +Enclave construction
> +--------------------
> +
> +The construction is started by filling out the SECS that contains enclave
> +address range, privileged attributes and measurement of TCS and REG pages (pages
> +that will be mapped to the address range) among the other things. This structure
> +is passed out to the ENCLS(ECREATE) together with a physical address of a page

This would make more sense to me:

   is passed to the ENCLS(ECREATE) instruction together with ...

> +in EPC that will hold the SECS.
> +
> +The pages are added with ENCLS(EADD) and measured with ENCLS(EEXTEND) i.e.

                                                     with ENCLS(EEXTEND), i.e.

> +SHA256 hash MRENCLAVE residing in the SECS is extended with the page data.
> +
> +After all of the pages have been added, the enclave is initialized with
> +ENCLS(EINIT). It will check that the SIGSTRUCT is signed with the contained
> +public key. If the given EINITTOKEN has the valid bit set, the CPU checks that
> +the token is valid (CMAC'd with the launch key). If the token is not valid,
> +the CPU will check whether the enclave is signed with a key matching to the
> +IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs.
> +
> +Swapping pages
> +--------------
> +
> +Enclave pages can be swapped out with ENCLS(EWB) to the unprotected memory. In
> +addition to the EPC page, ENCLS(EWB) takes in a VA page and address for PCMD
> +structure (Page Crypto MetaData) as input. The VA page will seal a version
> +number for the page. PCMD is 128 byte structure that contains tracking

                                128-byte

> +information for the page, most importantly its MAC. With these structures the
> +enclave is sealed and rollback protected while it resides in the unprotected
> +memory.
> +
> +Before the page can be swapped out it must not have any active TLB references.
> +ENCLS(EBLOCK) instruction moves a page to the *blocked* state, which means

 The ENCLS(EBLOCK) instruction

> +that no new TLB entries can be created to it by the hardware threads.
> +
> +After this a shootdown sequence is started with ENCLS(ETRACK), which sets an
> +increased counter value to the entering hardware threads. ENCLS(EWB) will
> +return SGX_NOT_TRACKED error while there are still threads with the earlier
> +couner value because that means that there might be hardware thread inside

   counter                                                      threads


> +the enclave with TLB entries to pages that are to be swapped.
> +
> +Kernel internals
> +================
> +
> +Requirements
> +------------
> +
> +Because SGX has an ever evolving and expanding feature set, it's possible for
> +a BIOS or VMM to configure a system in such a way that not all CPUs are equal,
> +e.g. where Launch Control is only enabled on a subset of CPUs.  Linux does
> +*not* support such a heterogeneous system configuration, nor does it even
> +attempt to play nice in the face of a misconfigured system.  With the exception
> +of Launch Control's hash MSRs, which can vary per CPU, Linux assumes that all
> +CPUs have a configuration that is identical to the boot CPU.
> +
> +
> +Roles and responsibilities
> +--------------------------
> +
> +SGX introduces system resources, e.g. EPC memory, that must be accessible to
> +multiple entities, e.g. the native kernel driver (to expose SGX to userspace)
> +and KVM (to expose SGX to VMs), ideally without introducing any dependencies
> +between each SGX entity.  To that end, the kernel owns and manages the shared
> +system resources, i.e. the EPC and Launch Control MSRs, and defines functions
> +that provide appropriate access to the shared resources.  SGX support for
> +user space and VMs is left to the SGX platform driver and KVM respectively.
> +
> +Launching enclaves
> +------------------
> +
> +The current kernel implementation supports only unlocked MSRs i.e.

                                                            MSRs, i.e.

> +FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR must be set. The launch is performed by setting the
> +MSRs to the hash of the public key modulus of the enclave signer, which is one
> +of the fields in the SIGSTRUCT.
> +
> +EPC management
> +--------------
> +
> +Due to the unique requirements for swapping EPC pages, and because EPC pages
> +(currently) do not have associated page structures, management of the EPC is
> +not handled by the standard Linux swapper.  SGX directly handles swapping
> +of EPC pages, including a kthread to initiate reclaim and a rudimentary LRU
> +mechanism. The consumers of EPC pages, e.g. the SGX driver, are required to
> +implement function callbacks that can be invoked by the kernel to age,
> +swap, and/or forcefully reclaim a target EPC page.  In effect, the kernel
> +controls what happens and when, while the consumers (driver, KVM, etc..) do
> +the actual work.
> +
> +Exception handling
> +------------------
> +
> +The PF_SGX bit is set if and only if the #PF is detected by the SGX Enclave Page
> +Cache Map (EPCM). The EPCM is a hardware-managed table that enforces accesses to
> +an enclave's EPC pages in addition to the software-managed kernel page tables,
> +i.e. the effective permissions for an EPC page are a logical AND of the kernel's
> +page tables and the corresponding EPCM entry.
> +
> +The EPCM is consulted only after an access walks the kernel's page tables, i.e.:
> +
> +1. the access was allowed by the kernel
> +2. the kernel's tables have become less restrictive than the EPCM
> +3. the kernel cannot fixup the cause of the fault
> +
> +Noteably, (2) implies that either the kernel has botched the EPC mappings or the

   Notably,

> +EPCM has been invalidated (see below).  Regardless of why the fault occurred,
> +userspace needs to be alerted so that it can take appropriate action, e.g.
> +restart the enclave. This is reinforced by (3) as the kernel doesn't really
> +have any other reasonable option, i.e. signalling SIGSEGV is actually the least
> +severe action possible.
> +
> +Although the primary purpose of the EPCM is to prevent a malicious or
> +compromised kernel from attacking an enclave, e.g. by modifying the enclave's
> +page tables, do not WARN on a #PF w/ PF_SGX set.  The SGX architecture

                                     with

> +effectively allows the CPU to invalidate all EPCM entries at will and requires
> +that software be prepared to handle an EPCM fault at any time.  The architecture
> +defines this behavior because the EPCM is encrypted with an ephemeral key that
> +isn't exposed to software.  As such, the EPCM entries cannot be preserved across
> +transitions that result in a new key being used, e.g. CPU power down as part of
> +an S3 transition or when a VM is live migrated to a new physical system.
> +
> +SGX uapi

       UAPI

> +========
> +
> +.. kernel-doc:: drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx/sgx_ioctl.c
> +   :functions: sgx_ioc_enclave_create
> +               sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page
> +               sgx_ioc_enclave_init
> +
> +.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> +
> +References
> +==========
> +
> +* A Memory Encryption Engine Suitable for General Purpose Processors
> +  <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/204.pdf>
> +* System Programming Manual: 39.1.4 Intel® SGX Launch Control Configuration


ciao.
-- 
~Randy

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