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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wg1geOzkaDUVuxW-qHxhqrtpx-iCvd+e1TxZQ_AmTtn0w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 11:49:44 -0800
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: mhocko@...nel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, pavel@....cz,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com, chanho.min@....com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Revert "exec: make de_thread() freezable (was: Re: Linux 4.20-rc4)
On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 11:33 AM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> Looking at this, I'm agreeing that ot would be better to just try to
> narrow down the cred_guard_mutex use a lot.
Ho humm. This is a crazy idea, but I don't see why it wouldn't work.
How about we:
- stop holding on to cred_guard_mutex entirely in the exec path
and instead just do:
- prepare_bprm_creds takes a ref to our old creds, and saves it off in the bprm
- security_bprm_{committing,committed}_creds() can do it's "is this a
valid transition" using the saved-off old creds instead of the current
creds
because honestly, the *only* reason we hold on to that lock is for the
insane and not really interesting case of "somebody tried to use
ptrace to change the creds in-flight during the exec".
Or maybe we could just add a task state flag that says "in exec, you
can't modify the creds in this window, because we're about to switch
to new creds".
Again, no *normal* situation will even notice or care, I think. We
hold the cred lock purely to make sure that the sequence from
prepare_exec_creds -> install_exec_creds is "atomic" wrt credentials,
and it already is for all the normal cases since this is all inside a
single execve system call.
Linus
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