linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 091/146] x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state

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Message-Id: <20181204103730.492796584@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue,  4 Dec 2018 11:49:37 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
        Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@...el.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 091/146] x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@...utronix.de

commit 130d6f946f6f2a972ee3ec8540b7243ab99abe97 upstream

Use the now exposed real SMT state, not the SMT sysfs control knob
state. This reflects the state of the system when the mitigation status is
queried.

This does not change the warning in the VMX launch code. There the
dependency on the control knob makes sense because siblings could be
brought online anytime after launching the VM.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@...el.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.613357354@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -829,13 +829,14 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf
 
 	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
 	    (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
-	     cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
+	     sched_smt_active())) {
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 			       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+	}
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
-		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 #else
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)