linux-kernel - [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.9 20/45] bpf: fix check of allowed specifiers in bpf_trace

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Message-Id: <20181205094706.7225-20-sashal@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed,  5 Dec 2018 04:46:41 -0500
From:   Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To:     stable@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Martynas Pumputis <m@...bda.lt>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.9 20/45] bpf: fix check of allowed specifiers in bpf_trace_printk

From: Martynas Pumputis <m@...bda.lt>

[ Upstream commit 1efb6ee3edea57f57f9fb05dba8dcb3f7333f61f ]

A format string consisting of "%p" or "%s" followed by an invalid
specifier (e.g. "%p%\n" or "%s%") could pass the check which
would make format_decode (lib/vsprintf.c) to warn.

Fixes: 9c959c863f82 ("tracing: Allow BPF programs to call bpf_trace_printk()")
Reported-by: syzbot+1ec5c5ec949c4adaa0c4@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martynas Pumputis <m@...bda.lt>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 41805fb3c661..7cc06f267be5 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -161,11 +161,13 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
 			i++;
 		} else if (fmt[i] == 'p' || fmt[i] == 's') {
 			mod[fmt_cnt]++;
-			i++;
-			if (!isspace(fmt[i]) && !ispunct(fmt[i]) && fmt[i] != 0)
+			/* disallow any further format extensions */
+			if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
+			    !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
+			    !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
 				return -EINVAL;
 			fmt_cnt++;
-			if (fmt[i - 1] == 's') {
+			if (fmt[i] == 's') {
 				if (str_seen)
 					/* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
 					return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.17.1