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Message-ID: <lsq.1544392233.468222381@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Sun, 09 Dec 2018 21:50:33 +0000
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Doug Ledford" <dledford@...hat.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 313/328] IB/ucm: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
3.16.62-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
commit 0295e39595e1146522f2722715dba7f7fba42217 upstream.
hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <rdma/ib.h>
@@ -1116,6 +1118,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_ucm_write(struct file
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
+ hdr.cmd = array_index_nospec(hdr.cmd, ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table));
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
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