linux-kernel - linux-next: manual merge of the f2fs tree with the fscrypt tree

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 11 Dec 2018 10:13:22 +1100
From:   Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
To:     Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc:     Linux Next Mailing List <linux-next@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Chandan Rajendra <chandan@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: linux-next: manual merge of the f2fs tree with the fscrypt tree

Hi all,

Today's linux-next merge of the f2fs tree got a conflict in:

  fs/f2fs/dir.c

between commit:

  848a010287e6 ("f2fs: use IS_ENCRYPTED() to check encryption status")

from the fscrypt tree and commit:

  4e240d1bab1e ("f2fs: check memory boundary by insane namelen")

from the f2fs tree.

I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
is submitted for merging.  You may also want to consider cooperating
with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
complex conflicts.

-- 
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell

diff --cc fs/f2fs/dir.c
index cf9e2564388d,c0c845da12fa..000000000000
--- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
@@@ -808,7 -808,18 +808,18 @@@ int f2fs_fill_dentries(struct dir_conte
  		de_name.name = d->filename[bit_pos];
  		de_name.len = le16_to_cpu(de->name_len);
  
+ 		/* check memory boundary before moving forward */
+ 		bit_pos += GET_DENTRY_SLOTS(le16_to_cpu(de->name_len));
+ 		if (unlikely(bit_pos > d->max)) {
+ 			f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ 				"%s: corrupted namelen=%d, run fsck to fix.",
+ 				__func__, le16_to_cpu(de->name_len));
+ 			set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ 			err = -EINVAL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
 -		if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(d->inode)) {
 +		if (IS_ENCRYPTED(d->inode)) {
  			int save_len = fstr->len;
  
  			err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(d->inode,

Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped