linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH 08/12] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification

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Message-ID: <12cec606-c31e-9321-b63f-7122ce068179@huawei.com>
Date:   Mon, 10 Dec 2018 19:04:53 +0100
From:   Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
To:     David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
CC:     <dwmw2@...radead.org>, <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        <davem@...emloft.net>, <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <silviu.vlasceanu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 08/12] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature
 verification

On 12/10/2018 5:58 PM, David Howells wrote:
> Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com> wrote:
> 
>>> You need to consider what it is that the patch trying to achieve.
>>
>> I understood that the purpose is to check PGP signatures with built-in
>> keys or keys provided by the user. Since using the session keyring
>> caused the issue I reported, I thought it was ok to use the user
>> keyring.
>>
>> Just a note: the original patches were relying on KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to
>> determine if a key is trusted; now the trustworthiness depends on the
>> type of keyring passed to pgp_verify_sig(). I removed the additional key
>> search in the user (session) keyring to prevent that signature
>> verification is done with a key provided by the user even when the
>> caller of pgp_verify_sig() expects that a trusted key is used. The
>> search in the session keyring is done if the caller of pgp_verify_sig()
>> sets the keyring pointer to NULL.
> 
> Thinking about these patches further, as you point out, the way that trust is
> computed has changed.  There is no no KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED; rather, a key is
> assumed to be trusted if it's on a trusted keyring.
> 
> *Getting* it onto that trusted keyring is then the trick.  There are two ways:
> 
>   (1) A key can be loaded from a trusted source during boot (say a compiled in
>       set of keys).
> 
>   (2) A key can be added to that keyring later, provided that the key is
>       verified by a key already in the ring and the ring hasn't been closed.
> 
> What do we need to check PGP signatures?  Blobs or keys as well?

For my use case, verifying blobs (RPM headers or 'Release' for Debian-
based distributions) would be sufficient. The keys can be added at
compile time.


> Why does the user keyring need to be a fallback?  (I know the session keyring
> used to be a fallback when I first did these, but things have changed since
> then).

Users can verify signatures with the pgp_test key type (patch 10/12).
During the first attempt, pgp_test tries to use built-in keys. If
verification fails, pgp_test tries again with keys in the user keyring.
But if verification succeeds during the second attempt, the kernel
prints a warning saying that an untrusted key was used.


> Should we have a separate built-in keyring for PGP keys?  Actually, I suspect
> we should probably mark keys in some way with what they're permitted to be
> used for.

I kept PGP keys in the main keyring, so that verify_pgp_signature() uses
the same convention of verify_pkcs7_signature() (keyring == NULL: use
primary keys, keyring == 1: use secondary keys).

In your patches there was a capability checking mechanism, but it was
removed with commit db6c43bd2132.

Roberto


> David
> 

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