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Message-Id: <20181210.121130.912436244375054028.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 12:11:30 -0800 (PST)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: gustavo@...eddedor.com
Cc: kuznet@....inr.ac.ru, yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ipv4: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 12:41:24 -0600
> vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
> net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Applied and queued up for -stable.
Please do not CC: stable for networking bug fixes, thank you.
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