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Message-ID: <87lg4upkpv.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:13:16 +0100
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Philippe Trébuchet
<philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
Yves-Alexis Perez <yves-alexis.perez@....gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] Add support for O_MAYEXEC
* James Morris:
> If you're depending on the script interpreter to flag that the user may
> execute code, this seems to be equivalent in security terms to depending
> on the user. e.g. what if the user uses ptrace and clears O_MAYEXEC?
The argument I've heard is this: Using ptrace (and adding the +x
attribute) are auditable events.
Florian
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