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Date:   Thu, 13 Dec 2018 13:12:06 -0500
From:   Tom Talpey <tom@...pey.com>
To:     Jerome Glisse <jglisse@...hat.com>
Cc:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        John Hubbard <john.hubbard@...il.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Linux MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, benve@...co.com,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        "Dalessandro, Dennis" <dennis.dalessandro@...el.com>,
        Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
        Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@...el.com>,
        rcampbell@...dia.com,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Weiny, Ira" <ira.weiny@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm: introduce put_user_page*(), placeholder versions

On 12/13/2018 10:18 AM, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 09:51:18AM -0500, Tom Talpey wrote:
>> On 12/13/2018 9:18 AM, Jerome Glisse wrote:
>>> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 08:40:49AM -0500, Tom Talpey wrote:
>>>> On 12/13/2018 7:43 AM, Jerome Glisse wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 08:20:43PM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 07:01:09PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 04:37:03PM -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 04:53:49PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Almost, we need some safety around assuming that DMA is complete the
>>>>>>>>>> page, so the notification would need to go all to way to userspace
>>>>>>>>>> with something like a file lease notification. It would also need to
>>>>>>>>>> be backstopped by an IOMMU in the case where the hardware does not /
>>>>>>>>>> can not stop in-flight DMA.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You can always reprogram the hardware right away it will redirect
>>>>>>>>> any dma to the crappy page.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That causes silent data corruption for RDMA users - we can't do that.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only way out for current hardware is to forcibly terminate the
>>>>>>>> RDMA activity somehow (and I'm not even sure this is possible, at
>>>>>>>> least it would be driver specific)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Even the IOMMU idea probably doesn't work, I doubt all current
>>>>>>>> hardware can handle a PCI-E error TLP properly.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What i saying is reprogram hardware to crappy page ie valid page
>>>>>>> dma map but that just has random content as a last resort to allow
>>>>>>> filesystem to reuse block. So their should be no PCIE error unless
>>>>>>> hardware freak out to see its page table reprogram randomly.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, that isn't an option. You can't silently provide corrupted data
>>>>>> for RDMA to transfer out onto the network, or silently discard data
>>>>>> coming in!!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Think of the consequences of that - I have a fileserver process and
>>>>>> someone does ftruncate and now my clients receive corrupted data??
>>>>>
>>>>> This is what happens _today_ ie today someone do GUP on page file
>>>>> and then someone else do truncate the first GUP is effectively
>>>>> streaming _random_ data to network as the page does not correspond
>>>>> to anything anymore and once the RDMA MR goes aways and release
>>>>> the page the page content will be lost. So i am not changing anything
>>>>> here, what i proposed was to make it explicit to device driver at
>>>>> least that they were streaming random data. Right now this is all
>>>>> silent but this is what is happening wether you like it or not :)
>>>>>
>>>>> Note that  i am saying do that only for truncate to allow to be
>>>>> nice to fs. But again i am fine with whatever solution but you can
>>>>> not please everyone here. Either block truncate and fs folks will
>>>>> hate you or make it clear to device driver that you are streaming
>>>>> random things and RDMA people hates you.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> The only option is to prevent the RDMA transfer from ever happening,
>>>>>> and we just don't have hardware support (beyond destroy everything) to
>>>>>> do that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The question is who do you want to punish ? RDMA user that pin stuff
>>>>>>> and expect thing to work forever without worrying for other fs
>>>>>>> activities ? Or filesystem to pin block forever :)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't want to punish everyone, I want both sides to have complete
>>>>>> data integrity as the USER has deliberately decided to combine DAX and
>>>>>> RDMA. So either stop it at the front end (ie get_user_pages_longterm)
>>>>>> or make it work in a way that guarantees integrity for both.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>        S2: notify userspace program through device/sub-system
>>>>>>>            specific API and delay ftruncate. After a while if there
>>>>>>>            is no answer just be mean and force hardware to use
>>>>>>>            crappy page as anyway this is what happens today
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think this happens today (outside of DAX).. Does it?
>>>>>
>>>>> It does it is just silent, i don't remember anything in the code
>>>>> that would stop a truncate to happen because of elevated refcount.
>>>>> This does not happen with ODP mlx5 as it does abide by _all_ mmu
>>>>> notifier. This is for anything that does ODP without support for
>>>>> mmu notifier.
>>>>
>>>> Wait - is it expected that the MMU notifier upcall is handled
>>>> synchronously? That is, the page DMA mapping must be torn down
>>>> immediately, and before returning?
>>>
>>> Yes you must torn down mapping before returning from mmu notifier
>>> call back. Any time after is too late. You obviously need hardware
>>> that can support that. In the infiniband sub-system AFAIK only the
>>> mlx5 hardware can do that. In the GPU sub-system everyone is fine.
>>
>> I'm skeptical that MLX5 can actually make this guarantee. But we
>> can take that offline in linux-rdma.
> 
> It does unless the code lies about what the hardware do :) See umem_odp.c
> in core and odp.c in mlx5 directories.

Ok, I did look and there are numerous error returns from these calls.
Some are related to resource shortages (including the rather ominous-
sounding "emergency_pages" in odp.c), others related to the generic
RDMA behaviors such as posting work requests and reaping their
completion status.

So I'd ask - what is the backup plan from the mmu notifier if the
unmap fails? Which it certainly will, in many real-world situations.

Tom.

>> I'm also skeptical that NVMe can do this.
>>
>>> Dunno about other sub-systems.
>>>
>>>
>>>> That's simply not possible, since the hardware needs to get control
>>>> to do this. Even if there were an IOMMU that could intercept the
>>>> DMA, reprogramming it will require a flush, which cannot be guaranteed
>>>> to occur "inline".
>>>
>>> If hardware can not do that then hardware should not use GUP, at
>>> least not on file back page. I advocated in favor of forbiding GUP
>>> for device that can not do that as right now this silently breaks
>>> in few cases (truncate, mremap, splice, reflink, ...). So the device
>>> in those cases can end up with GUPed pages that do not correspond
>>> to anything anymore ie they do not correspond to the memory backing
>>> the virtual address they were GUP against, nor they correspond to
>>> the file content at the given offset anymore. It is just random
>>> data as far as the kernel or filesystem is concern.
>>>
>>> Of course for this to happen you need an application that do stupid
>>> thing like create an MR in one thread on the mmap of a file and
>>> truncate that same file in another thread (or from the same thread).
>>>
>>> So this is unlikely to happen in sane program. It does not mean it
>>> will not happen.
>>
>> Completely agree. In other words, this is the responsibility of the
>> DAX (or g-u-p) consumer, which is nt necessarily the program itself,
>> it could be an upper layer.
>>
>> In SMB3 and NFSv4, which I've been focused on, we envision using the
>> existing protocol leases to protect this. When requesting a DAX mapping,
>> the server may requires an exclusive lease. If this mapping needs to
>> change, because of another conflicting mapping, the lease would be
>> recalled and the mapping dropped. This is a normal and well-established
>> filesystem requirement.
>>
>> The twist here is that the platform itself can initiate such an event.
>> It's my belief that this plumbing must flow to the *top* of the stack,
>> i.e. the entity that took the mapping (e.g. filesystem), and not
>> depend on the MMU notifier at the very bottom.
> 
> So this patchset is about mm plumbings, what fs does before mm code
> gets call is a fs discussion. Note also that GUP is always against
> a virtual address of a process. GUP is use by few driver to allow
> the device direct access to some portion of process address space.
> 
> The issues is that some of those device have designed an API that
> fully ignore things like munmap, splice, truncate, ... and as such
> they open the door for undefined behavior. I believe the original
> intention in all the cases was that the user would not do stupid
> thing like setup the device mapping through device specific API and
> then munmap or truncate or anything that would affect the range of
> virtual address.
> 
> Thing is from kernel point of view we should not and can not assume
> that userspace will behave properly. So we have to brace for the
> worst. Which is what this patchset is trying to do ie fix some of
> issues and make the rest of them explicit to device driver so that
> they can decide what to do about it.
> 
> My advice is for each of those sub-system/device to fail loudly
> when such thing happens so that the user knows he is doing something
> stupid or illegal.
> 
> 
>>> The second set of issue at to deals with set_page_dirty happening
>>> long time after page_release did happens and thus the fs dirty
>>> page callback will see page in bad state and will BUG() and you
>>> will have an oops and loose any data your device might have written
>>> to the page. This is highly filesystem dependend and also timing
>>> dependend and link to thing like memory pressure so it might not
>>> happen that often but again it can happen.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> .. and the remedy here is to kill the process, not provide corrupt
>>>>>> data. Kill the process is likely to not go over well with any real
>>>>>> users that want this combination.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Think Samba serving files over RDMA - you can't have random unpriv
>>>>>> users calling ftruncate and causing smbd to be killed or serve corrupt
>>>>>> data.
>>>>>
>>>>> So what i am saying is there is a choice and it would be better to
>>>>> decide something than let the existing status quo where we just keep
>>>>> streaming random data after truncate to a GUPed page.
>>>>
>>>> Let's also remember that any torn-down DMA mapping can't be recycled
>>>> until all uses of the old DMA addresses are destroyed. The whole
>>>> thing screams for reference counting all the way down, to me.
>>>
>>> I am not saying reuse the DMA address in the emergency_mean_callback
>>> the idea was:
>>>
>>>       gup_page_emergency_revoke(device, page)
>>>       {
>>>           crapy_page = alloc_page();
>>>           dma_addr = dma_map(crappy_page, device, ...);
>>>           mydevice_page_table_update(device, crappy_page, dma_addr);
>>>           mydevice_tlb_flush(device);
>>>           mydevice_wait_pending_dma(device)
>>>
>>>           // at this point the original GUPed page is not access by hw
>>>
>>>           dma_unmap(page);
>>>           put_user_page(page);
>>>       }
>>
>> Ok, but my concern was also that the old DMA address then becomes
>> unused and may be grabbed by a new i/o. If the hardware still has
>> reads or writes in flight, and they arrive after the old address
>> becomes valid, well, oops.
> 
> In above code at the comment point the driver garanty the hardware
> will never use the old dma address any more ie that all in flight
> dma are done. I know this can be done for some devices. It might
> very well not work for all and this is why this need to be a sub-
> system/device discussion.
> 
> Cheers,
> Jérôme
> 
> 

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