[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <s5hr2elu9mv.wl-tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 09:13:44 +0100
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>
To: " Gustavo A. R. Silva " <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Cc: "Jaroslav Kysela" <perex@...ex.cz>, <alsa-devel@...a-project.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ALSA: emux_hwdep: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
On Wed, 12 Dec 2018 18:20:49 +0100,
Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
> info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space,
> hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
> vulnerability.
>
> These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
> sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap)
> sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them
> to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and
> emu->portptrs.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Applied now (with moving the linux/nospec.h in a more appropriate
line).
thanks,
Takashi
Powered by blists - more mailing lists