linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 5/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass

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Message-ID: <96ac8a3f-9c03-9ad9-e148-5f3422c51075@arm.com>
Date:   Fri, 14 Dec 2018 10:41:42 +0000
From:   Steven Price <steven.price@....com>
To:     Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Cc:     mark.rutland@....com, suzuki.poulose@....com, marc.zyngier@....com,
        catalin.marinas@....com, ykaukab@...e.de,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>, shankerd@...eaurora.org,
        dave.martin@....com, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative
 store bypass

On 14/12/2018 10:36, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 10:34:31AM +0000, Steven Price wrote:
>> On 06/12/2018 23:44, Jeremy Linton wrote:
>>> From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@...e.de>
>>>
>>> Return status based no ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature.
>>                       ^^ on
>>
>>> Return string "Unknown" in case CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD is
>>> disabled or arch workaround2 is not available
>>> in the firmware.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@...e.de>
>>> [Added SSBS logic]
>>> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
>>> ---
>>>  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>> index 6505c93d507e..8aeb5ca38db8 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>> @@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>>  		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
>>>  		return false;
>>>  
>>> +	/* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
>>>  	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
>>>  		pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
>>>  		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
>>> @@ -828,4 +829,31 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>>>  	}
>>>  }
>>>  
>>> +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
>>> +		struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>>> +{
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 *  Two assumptions: First, get_ssbd_state() reflects the worse case
>>> +	 *  for hetrogenous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
>>                                                   ^^^^ SSBD
>>> +	 *  supported by all cores.
>>> +	 */
>>> +	switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
>>> +	case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
>>> +		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>>> +
>>> +	case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
>>> +	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
>>> +		if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
>>> +			return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>>> +		return sprintf(buf,
>>> +			"Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");
>>
>> NIT: To me this reads as the mitigation is disabled. Can we call it
>> "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" (with a capital 'D' and without the
>> 'd at the end)?
> 
> Whilst I agree that the strings are reasonably confusing (especially when
> you pile on the double-negatives all the way up the stack!), we really
> have no choice but to follow x86's lead with these strings.
> 
> I don't think it's worth forking the ABI in an attempt to make this clearer.

Ah, sorry I hadn't checked the x86 string - yes we should match that.

Steve

> Will
> 
> _______________________________________________
> linux-arm-kernel mailing list
> linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
> http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
> 

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