lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Fri, 14 Dec 2018 13:00:36 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 62/88] bpf: support 8-byte metafield access

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>

commit cedaf52693f02372010548c63b2e63228b959099 upstream.

The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in
struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming
struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs.
Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access.
The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs.
They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1844,7 +1844,8 @@ static int do_check(struct verifier_env
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 
-			if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W) {
+			if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W &&
+			    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
 				insn_idx++;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -2220,9 +2221,11 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct v
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
 		u32 cnt;
 
-		if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W))
+		if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
+		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
 			type = BPF_READ;
-		else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W))
+		else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
+			 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
 			type = BPF_WRITE;
 		else
 			continue;


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ