linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

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Message-ID: <20181218014008.GD333@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 18 Dec 2018 03:40:08 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, nhorman@...hat.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        shay.katz-zamir@...el.com,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, mark.shanahan@...el.com,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@...radead.org>,
        "open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" 
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:10:17PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:03 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 12/17/18 11:55 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > >> You're effectively rebuilding reverse-mapping infrastructure here.  It's
> > >> a frequent thing for the core VM to need to go from 'struct page' back
> > >> to the page tables mapping it.  For that we go (logically)
> > >> page->{anon_vma,mapping}->vma->vm_mm->pagetable.
> > > This is a bit outside my expertise here, but doesn't
> > > unmap_mapping_range() do exactly what SGX wants?
> >
> > There's no 'struct page' for enclave memory as it stands.  That means no
> > page cache, and that means there's no 'struct address_space *mapping' in
> > the first place.
> >
> > Basically, the choice was made a long time ago to have SGX's memory
> > management live outside the core VM.  I've waffled back and forth on it,
> > but I do still think this is the right way to do it.
> 
> AFAICS a lack of struct page isn't a problem.  The core code seems to
> understand that address_space objects might cover non-struct-page
> memory.  Morally, enclave memory is a lot like hot-unpluggable PCI
> space.

I'm fine using it if it works. Will try it for v19.

/Jarkko