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Message-ID: <s5ha7l0obxk.wl-tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2018 09:11:03 +0100
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>
To: " Gustavo A. R. Silva " <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Cc: "Jaroslav Kysela" <perex@...ex.cz>, <alsa-devel@...a-project.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ALSA: isa/wavefront: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
On Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:31:43 +0100,
Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
> header->number is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
> to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:792 wavefront_send_patch() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->patch_status' [w] (local cap)
> sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:819 wavefront_send_program() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->prog_status' [w] (local cap)
> sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:1197 wavefront_send_alias() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->sample_status' [w]
> sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:1248 wavefront_send_multisample() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->sample_status' [w]
> sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:1548 wavefront_synth_control() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->sample_status' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing header->number before using it to index
> dev->patch_status, dev->prog_status and dev->sample_status.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Is there any platform with ISA slot that suffers from Spectre?
thanks,
Takashi
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