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Message-Id: <20181220085922.464426676@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2018 10:18:02 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 03/72] aio: fix spectre gadget in lookup_ioctx
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>
commit a538e3ff9dabcdf6c3f477a373c629213d1c3066 upstream.
Matthew pointed out that the ioctx_table is susceptible to spectre v1,
because the index can be controlled by an attacker. The below patch
should mitigate the attack for all of the aio system calls.
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
fs/aio.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <asm/kmap_types.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -1084,6 +1085,7 @@ static struct kioctx *lookup_ioctx(unsig
if (!table || id >= table->nr)
goto out;
+ id = array_index_nospec(id, table->nr);
ctx = rcu_dereference(table->table[id]);
if (ctx && ctx->user_id == ctx_id) {
if (percpu_ref_tryget_live(&ctx->users))
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