linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

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Date:   Fri, 21 Dec 2018 10:28:09 -0800
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, nhorman@...hat.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        shay.katz-zamir@...el.com,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, mark.shanahan@...el.com,
        Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@...el.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@...radead.org>,
        "open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" 
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 07:00:47AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:53:49AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > What if we re-organize the ioctls in such a way that we leave open the
> > possibility of allocating raw EPC for KVM via /dev/sgx?  I'm not 100%
> > positive this approach will work[1], but conceptually it fits well with
> > KVM's memory model, e.g. KVM is aware of the GPA<->HVA association but
> > generally speaking doesn't know what's physically backing each memory
> > region.
> 
> Why would you want to pass EPC through user space to KVM rather than
> KVM allocating it through kernel interfaces?

Delegating EPC management to userspace fits better with KVM's existing
memory ABI.  KVM provides a single ioctl(), KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION[1],
that allows userspace to create, move, modify and delete memory regions.

Skipping over a lot of details, there are essentially three options for
exposing EPC to a KVM guest:

 1) Provide a dedicated KVM ioctl() to manage EPC without routing it
    through KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION.

 2) Add a flag to 'struct kvm_userspace_memory_region' that denotes an
    EPC memory region and mmap() / allocate EPC in KVM.

 3) Provide an ABI to allocate raw EPC and let userspace manage it like
    any other memory region.

Option (1) requires duplicating all of KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION's
functionality unless the ioctl() is severly restricted.

Option (2) is an ugly abuse of KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION since the EPC
flag would have completely different semantics than all other usage of
KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION.

Thus, option (3).

Probably a better question to answer is why provide the ABI through
/dev/sgx and not /dev/kvm.  IMO /dev/sgx is a more logical way to
advertise support to userspace, e.g. userspace can simply check if
/dev/sgx (or /dev/sgx/epc) exists vs. probing a KVM capability.

Without EPC oversubscription in KVM, /dev/sgx is easily the best fit
since the EPC management would reside completely in x86/sgx, i.e. KVM
would essentially have zero code related to EPC management.

EPC oversubscription complicates things because the architecture forces
aspects of VMM oversubscription into the KVM domain, e.g. requires a
post-VMXON instruction (ENCLV) and a VM-Exit handler.   I still think
/dev/sgx is a better fit, my only concern is that the oversubscription
code would be even more heinous due to splitting responsibilities.
But, Andy's idea of having /dev/sgx/enclave vs. /dev/sgx/epc might help
avoid that entirely.