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Message-Id: <20181222.150842.1563344934152542563.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Sat, 22 Dec 2018 15:08:42 -0800 (PST)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: gustavo@...eddedor.com
Cc: courmisch@...il.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2018 15:41:17 -0600
> protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Applied, thanks.
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