linux-kernel - Re: x86/sgx: uapi change proposal

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CALCETrXhuVx3oFUUr5KRGPXrEpcUPjFXapLdHYJZ8C+91woh_Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sun, 23 Dec 2018 12:42:48 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@...ellic.com>
Subject: Re: x86/sgx: uapi change proposal

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 4:52 AM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 10:25:02AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 10:16:49AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 12:32:04PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 06:58:48PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > > > Can one of you explain why SGX_ENCLAVE_CREATE is better than just
> > > > > opening a new instance of /dev/sgx for each encalve?
> > > >
> > > > I think that fits better to the SCM_RIGHTS scenario i.e. you could send
> > > > the enclav to a process that does not have necessarily have rights to
> > > > /dev/sgx. Gives more robust environment to configure SGX.
> > >
> > > Sean, is this why you wanted enclave fd and anon inode and not just use
> > > the address space of /dev/sgx? Just taking notes of all observations.
> > > I'm not sure what your rationale was (maybe it was somewhere). This was
> > > something I made up, and this one is wrong deduction. You can easily
> > > get the same benefit with /dev/sgx associated fd representing the
> > > enclave.
> > >
> > > This all means that for v19 I'm going without enclave fd involved with
> > > fd to /dev/sgx representing the enclave. No anon inodes will be
> > > involved.
> >
> > Based on these observations I updated the uapi.
> >
> > As far as I'm concerned there has to be a solution to do EPC mapping
> > with a sequence:
> >
> > 1. Ping /dev/kvm to do something.
> > 2. KVM asks SGX core to do something.
> > 3. SGX core does something.
> >
> > I don't care what the something is exactly is, but KVM is the only sane
> > place for KVM uapi. I would be surprised if KVM maintainers didn't agree
> > that they don't want to sprinkle KVM uapi to random places in other
> > subsystems.
>
> The one option to consider to do would be to have a device driver for
> KVM if you really want this e.g. something like /dev/vsgx. With the
> current knowledge I'm not yet sure why all could not be done just
> through /dev/kvm.
>

That seems reasonable too.  I don't really care about the path to the
device node, but it does seem reasonable to me to have it be a
separate node entirely from the normal enclave interface.