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Message-Id: <20181228113126.323491777@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 28 Dec 2018 12:52:20 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>, security@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 26/46] x86/mtrr: Dont copy uninitialized gentry fields back to userspace

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>

commit 32043fa065b51e0b1433e48d118821c71b5cd65d upstream.

Currently the copy_to_user of data in the gentry struct is copying
uninitiaized data in field _pad from the stack to userspace.

Fix this by explicitly memset'ing gentry to zero, this also will zero any
compiler added padding fields that may be in struct (currently there are
none).

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#200783 ("Uninitialized scalar variable")

Fixes: b263b31e8ad6 ("x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Cc: security@...nel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181218172956.1440-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned i
 	struct mtrr_gentry gentry;
 	void __user *arg = (void __user *) __arg;
 
+	memset(&gentry, 0, sizeof(gentry));
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case MTRRIOC_ADD_ENTRY:
 	case MTRRIOC_SET_ENTRY:


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