linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass

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Date:   Wed,  2 Jan 2019 18:49:20 -0600
From:   Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
To:     linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc:     catalin.marinas@....com, will.deacon@....com, marc.zyngier@....com,
        suzuki.poulose@....com, dave.martin@....com,
        shankerd@...eaurora.org, mark.rutland@....com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, ykaukab@...e.de,
        julien.thierry@....com, mlangsdo@...hat.com, steven.price@....com,
        Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass

From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@...e.de>

Return status based on ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature.
Return string "Unknown" in case CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD is disabled
or arch workaround2 is not available in the firmware.

Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@...e.de>
[Added SSBS logic]
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 96a55accefa9..c962b5856c87 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
 		return false;
 
+	/* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
 	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
 		pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
@@ -810,4 +811,31 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	}
 }
 
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+		struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	/*
+	 *  Two assumptions: First, get_ssbd_state() reflects the worse case
+	 *  for hetrogenous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
+	 *  supported by all cores.
+	 */
+	switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
+	case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
+	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
+		if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
+			return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+		return sprintf(buf,
+			"Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");
+
+	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+
+	default: /* ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN*/
+		return sprintf(buf, "Unknown\n");
+	}
+}
+
 #endif
-- 
2.17.2