Date:   Thu,  3 Jan 2019 22:32:23 +0800
From:   "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>
To:     "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
        Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
        Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
        Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.com>,
        Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@...il.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Giovanni Gherdovich <ggherdovich@...e.cz>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/5 v2] PM / hibernate: Create snapshot keys handler

This patch adds a snapshot keys handler for using the key retention
service api to create keys for snapshot image encryption and
authentication.

This handler uses TPM trusted key as the snapshot master key, and the
encryption key and authentication key are derived from the snapshot
key. The user defined key can also be used as the snapshot master key
, but user must be aware that the security of user key relies on user
space.

The name of snapshot key is fixed to "swsusp-kmk". User should use
the keyctl tool to load the key blob to root's user keyring. e.g.

 # /bin/keyctl add trusted swsusp-kmk "load `cat swsusp-kmk.blob`" @u

or create a new user key. e.g.

 # /bin/keyctl add user swsusp-kmk password @u

Then the disk_kmk sysfs file can be used to trigger the initialization
of snapshot key:

 # echo 1 > /sys/power/disk_kmk

After the initialization be triggered, the secret in the payload of
swsusp-key will be copied by hibernation and be erased. Then user can
use keyctl to remove swsusp-kmk key from root's keyring.

If user does not trigger the initialization by disk_kmk file after
swsusp-kmk be loaded to kernel. Then the snapshot key will be
initialled when hibernation be triggered.

v2:
- Fixed bug of trusted_key_init's return value.
- Fixed wording in Kconfig
- Removed VLA usage
- Removed the checking of capability for writing disk_kmk.
- Fixed Kconfig, select trusted key.
- Add memory barrier before setting key initialized flag.

Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>
Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.com>
Cc: Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@...il.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Giovanni Gherdovich <ggherdovich@...e.cz>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>
---
 kernel/power/Kconfig        |  14 +++
 kernel/power/Makefile       |   1 +
 kernel/power/hibernate.c    |  33 ++++++
 kernel/power/power.h        |  16 +++
 kernel/power/snapshot_key.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 309 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 kernel/power/snapshot_key.c

diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig
index f8fe57d1022e..506a3c5a7a0d 100644
--- a/kernel/power/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig
@@ -76,6 +76,20 @@ config HIBERNATION
 
 	  For more information take a look at <file:Documentation/power/swsusp.txt>.
 
+config HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH
+ 	bool "Hibernation encryption and authentication"
+ 	depends on HIBERNATION
+	select TRUSTED_KEYS
+	select CRYPTO_AES
+ 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ 	select CRYPTO_SHA512
+ 	help
+	  This option will encrypt and authenticate the memory snapshot image
+	  of hibernation. It prevents that the snapshot image be arbitrarily
+	  modified. A user can use the TPM's trusted key or user defined key
+	  as the master key of hibernation. The TPM trusted key depends on TPM.
+	  The security of user defined key relies on user space.
+
 config ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS
 	bool
 
diff --git a/kernel/power/Makefile b/kernel/power/Makefile
index e7e47d9be1e5..d949adbaf580 100644
--- a/kernel/power/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/power/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FREEZER)		+= process.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SUSPEND)		+= suspend.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM_TEST_SUSPEND)	+= suspend_test.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION)	+= hibernate.o snapshot.o swap.o user.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH)	+= snapshot_key.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP)	+= autosleep.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS)	+= wakelock.o
 
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index abef759de7c8..ecc31e8e40d0 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -1034,6 +1034,36 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
 
 power_attr(disk);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH
+static ssize_t disk_kmk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			     char *buf)
+{
+	if (snapshot_key_initialized())
+		return sprintf(buf, "initialized\n");
+	else
+		return sprintf(buf, "uninitialized\n");
+}
+
+static ssize_t disk_kmk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			      const char *buf, size_t n)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+	char *p;
+	int len;
+
+	p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
+	len = p ? p - buf : n;
+	if (strncmp(buf, "1", len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	error = snapshot_key_init();
+
+	return error ? error : n;
+}
+
+power_attr(disk_kmk);
+#endif /* !CONFIG_HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH */
+
 static ssize_t resume_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
 			   char *buf)
 {
@@ -1138,6 +1168,9 @@ power_attr(reserved_size);
 
 static struct attribute * g[] = {
 	&disk_attr.attr,
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH
+	&disk_kmk_attr.attr,
+#endif
 	&resume_offset_attr.attr,
 	&resume_attr.attr,
 	&image_size_attr.attr,
diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
index 9e58bdc8a562..fe2dfa0d4d36 100644
--- a/kernel/power/power.h
+++ b/kernel/power/power.h
@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+
+/* The max size of encrypted key blob */
+#define KEY_BLOB_BUFF_LEN 512
+#define SNAPSHOT_KEY_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define DERIVED_KEY_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
 
 struct swsusp_info {
 	struct new_utsname	uts;
@@ -20,6 +26,16 @@ struct swsusp_info {
 extern void __init hibernate_reserved_size_init(void);
 extern void __init hibernate_image_size_init(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH
+/* kernel/power/snapshot_key.c */
+extern int snapshot_key_init(void);
+extern bool snapshot_key_initialized(void);
+extern int snapshot_get_auth_key(u8 *auth_key, bool may_sleep);
+extern int snapshot_get_enc_key(u8 *enc_key, bool may_sleep);
+#else
+static inline int snapshot_key_init(void) { return 0; }
+#endif	/* !CONFIG_HIBERNATION_ENC_AUTH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HIBERNATION_HEADER
 /* Maximum size of architecture specific data in a hibernation header */
 #define MAX_ARCH_HEADER_SIZE	(sizeof(struct new_utsname) + 4)
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot_key.c b/kernel/power/snapshot_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3a569b505d8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/* snapshot keys handler
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@...e.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+
+#include "power.h"
+
+static const char hash_alg[] = "sha512";
+static struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
+
+/* The master key of snapshot */
+static struct snapshot_key {
+	const char *key_name;
+	bool initialized;
+	unsigned int key_len;
+	u8 key[SNAPSHOT_KEY_SIZE];
+} skey = {
+	.key_name = "swsusp-kmk",
+};
+
+static int calc_hash(u8 *digest, const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+		     bool may_sleep)
+{
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	int err;
+
+	desc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+		       crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm),
+		       may_sleep ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!desc)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	desc->tfm = hash_tfm;
+	desc->flags = may_sleep ? CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP : 0;
+	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, buf, buflen, digest);
+	shash_desc_zero(desc);
+	kzfree(desc);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int calc_key_hash(u8 *key, unsigned int key_len, const char *salt,
+			 u8 *hash, bool may_sleep)
+{
+	unsigned int salted_buf_len;
+	u8 *salted_buf;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!key || !hash_tfm || !hash)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	salted_buf_len = strlen(salt) + 1 + SNAPSHOT_KEY_SIZE;
+	salted_buf = kzalloc(salted_buf_len,
+			may_sleep ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!salted_buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	strcpy(salted_buf, salt);
+	memcpy(salted_buf + strlen(salted_buf) + 1, key, key_len);
+
+	ret = calc_hash(hash, salted_buf, salted_buf_len, may_sleep);
+	memzero_explicit(salted_buf, salted_buf_len);
+	kzfree(salted_buf);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Derive authentication/encryption key */
+static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, const char *derived_type_str,
+			   bool may_sleep)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!skey.initialized || !hash_tfm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = calc_key_hash(skey.key, skey.key_len, derived_type_str,
+				derived_key, may_sleep);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int snapshot_get_auth_key(u8 *auth_key, bool may_sleep)
+{
+	return get_derived_key(auth_key, "AUTH_KEY", may_sleep);
+}
+
+int snapshot_get_enc_key(u8 *enc_key, bool may_sleep)
+{
+	return get_derived_key(enc_key, "ENC_KEY", may_sleep);
+}
+
+bool snapshot_key_initialized(void)
+{
+	return skey.initialized;
+}
+
+static bool invalid_key(u8 *key, unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!key || !key_len)
+		return true;
+
+	if (key_len > SNAPSHOT_KEY_SIZE) {
+		pr_warn("Size of swsusp key more than: %d.\n",
+			SNAPSHOT_KEY_SIZE);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/* zero keyblob is invalid key */
+	for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++) {
+		if (key[i] != 0)
+			return false;
+	}
+	pr_warn("The swsusp key should not be zero.\n");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int trusted_key_init(void)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
+	struct key *key;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	/* find out swsusp-key */
+	key = request_key(&key_type_trusted, skey.key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Request key error: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(key));
+		err = PTR_ERR(key);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+	tkp = key->payload.data[0];
+	if (invalid_key(tkp->key, tkp->key_len)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto key_invalid;
+	}
+	skey.key_len = tkp->key_len;
+	memcpy(skey.key, tkp->key, tkp->key_len);
+	/* burn the original key contents */
+	memzero_explicit(tkp->key, tkp->key_len);
+
+key_invalid:
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int user_key_init(void)
+{
+	struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+	struct key *key;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	/* find out swsusp-key */
+	key = request_key(&key_type_user, skey.key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Request key error: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(key));
+		err = PTR_ERR(key);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	down_write(&key->sem);
+	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+	if (!ukp) {
+		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+		err = -EKEYREVOKED;
+		goto key_invalid;
+	}
+	if (invalid_key(ukp->data, ukp->datalen)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto key_invalid;
+	}
+	skey.key_len = ukp->datalen;
+	memcpy(skey.key, ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
+	/* burn the original key contents */
+	memzero_explicit(ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
+
+key_invalid:
+	up_write(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* this function may sleeps */
+int snapshot_key_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	pr_debug("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (skey.initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("Can't allocate %s transform: %ld\n",
+			hash_alg, PTR_ERR(hash_tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
+	}
+
+	err = trusted_key_init();
+	if (err)
+		err = user_key_init();
+	if (err)
+		goto key_fail;
+
+	barrier();
+	skey.initialized = true;
+
+	pr_info("Snapshot key is initialled.\n");
+
+	return 0;
+
+key_fail:
+	crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
+	hash_tfm = NULL;
+
+	return err;
+}
-- 
2.13.6

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