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Message-Id: <20190107104453.608224495@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 13:30:32 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 005/170] ip6mr: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
[ Upstream commit 69d2c86766da2ded2b70281f1bf242cb0d58a778 ]
vr.mifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1845 ip6mr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1919 ip6mr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing vr.mifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
#include <linux/netconf.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
struct ip6mr_rule {
struct fib_rule common;
};
@@ -1831,6 +1833,7 @@ int ip6mr_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd
return -EFAULT;
if (vr.mifi >= mrt->maxvif)
return -EINVAL;
+ vr.mifi = array_index_nospec(vr.mifi, mrt->maxvif);
read_lock(&mrt_lock);
vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.mifi];
if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.mifi)) {
@@ -1905,6 +1908,7 @@ int ip6mr_compat_ioctl(struct sock *sk,
return -EFAULT;
if (vr.mifi >= mrt->maxvif)
return -EINVAL;
+ vr.mifi = array_index_nospec(vr.mifi, mrt->maxvif);
read_lock(&mrt_lock);
vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.mifi];
if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.mifi)) {
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